The Strategic Reserve: What it is, and why it could be you.

The term Strategic Reserve has become common parlance across Defence, including explicit reference in the latest Command Plan. However, it exists without an official definition, or clearly articulated purpose. There are a similar number of Volunteer Reserves as there are ex-Regulars with a legal liability for reserve service, as well as potentially many more veterans who could be called upon in time of national need. Unfortunately, we don’t track service leavers sufficiently well and have very limited understanding of who is considered within the Strategic Reserve. Changes to legislation, policy simplification and technology can all assist, but the single biggest factor that needs to be addressed is attitude to reserve service, including societal responsibility towards the protection of our nation.

In this article I argue that we already have a Strategic Reserve. We just don’t know who it is, where it is, or what it’s for!

Part I – What is the Strategic Reserve?

In my first offering to the Wavell Room last year, Reserves – what are they good for? I argued the need to improve access to those with deep specialist skills or previous regular experience who could contribute to routine Defence outputs as part of the ‘Active Reserve’. Set against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Eastern Europe, the current lack of a published UK National Defence and Resilience Plan, the reality of declining regular and reserve forces numbers and rekindled debates surrounding National Service, this article focuses on the value of a ‘Strategic Reserve’.

By way of political context, the 2021 Integrated Review pledged to make greater use of reserves in supporting domestic national security priorities. This was expanded in the 2023 Defence Command Paper which observed that “prevailing in war is a national effort…The Strategic Reserve – built around the ex-regular reserve forces – will add further depth of capability, able to generate previously unassigned surge capacity and wider access to expertise in time of crisis or national emergency.” Of course, it would be useful here to define the ‘Strategic Reserve’ but herein lies the first issue; there is currently no Defence-wide agreed definition.

Part of the problem is that there is currently no specific Defence-level demand articulated for the Strategic Reserve, and consequently the single Services are limited in their ability to plan against this undefined latent requirement. Previous attempts to provide precise definitions have tended to be overly complex, perhaps understandable given the plethora of primary and secondary legislation and single Service policies surrounding reserve service. However, I would argue that the lexicon needs to be kept relatively simple to be understood by the key audiences – not necessarily just within Defence, but by reservists, their families, their civilian employers and by Other Government Departments who have a fundamental part to play in national defence and resilience activities.

Language and policy surrounding Reserves is complex. In broad terms, the nation’s Reserve Forces are all those who may be called out for permanent service under section 52 of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (RFA 96). This includes Part-Time Volunteer Reserves¹ and the ex-Regular Reserve who retain a call-out liability on termination of their regular service. There is also the Recall Reserve, comprised of individuals who have completed their military service and any compulsory or voluntary reserve commitment. By way of example, notwithstanding the fact I am currently serving on a full-time reserve service engagement, as an ex-regular RAF Officer, on leaving regular service I would have had a compulsory reserve liability for 4 years (not that I was aware of this at the time), followed by a recall liability under section 66 of the RFA 96 until aged 55, applicable in times of imminent national danger or emergency. By way of contrast, Royal Navy personnel may have a 6-year recall liability, whereas Army officers typically have a regular reserve liability until aged 60, and a recall liability in perpetuity. Whilst a change of secondary legislation would be required, one may obviously conclude that it might be prudent to have a common method (perhaps linked to state pension age) rather than the current approach in times of great national danger whereby a former Royal Marine in their prime does not have a recall liability, whereas a 98-year-old Army veteran does*.²

If you’ve made it this far, the astute amongst you would have noted that I haven’t yet tried to define the ‘Strategic Reserve’. Prior to doing so, it is perhaps easier to articulate what I believe the ‘Active Reserve’ is: effectively all part-time volunteer reservists and ex-regular reserves serving in current appointments.³ Therefore, the ‘Strategic Reserve’, who may potentially be available to provide greater depth of national resilience and follow-on forces, are predominantly those ex-regular reserves with a reserve liability not currently conducting Active Reserve duties, in addition to the Recall Reserve.

So, let’s try and put some numbers to this. According to Defence Statistics as at Apr 24 there were 138,120 UK Regular Forces (down 3% since Apr 23) and a total of 32,490 Volunteer Reserves. The ex-Regular Reserve strength (those having a current reserve liability) is estimated at around 33,000 – the same order of magnitude as the volunteer reserve strength. Of these ex-regular personnel, approximately 10% (circa 3,500) are already employed across Defence serving on a range of commitment types in active appointments. Finally, the 2021 census details an estimated veteran’s population of between 1.4-1.8 million in England and Wales, of which a proportion would retain some liability through the Recall Reserve.

However, this brings us to another problem – we don’t track service leavers sufficiently well and therefore have very limited understanding of: who is considered within the Strategic Reserve; where they live; how to contact them; their medical, security or employment status; their key skills; their kitting requirements; or indeed their suitability for re-engagement should the need arise. Legislation already exists requiring former members of the armed forces with a recall liability to provide up to date information on their whereabouts and fitness for service, but there has been little appetite to compel individuals to respond to the legacy and inconsistently applied Annual Reporting Letter. Contact details can be tracked through HMRC data, but again this is insufficient to provide any degree of assurance over the state of the Strategic Reserve. Whilst not currently considered through legislation, the extension of reserve liability to former Active Reserves may also be worthy of consideration given they provide an untapped pool of trained personnel who enjoy membership of the same pension scheme as their regular cohort.

This is crying out for a digital solution – let’s call it a MyVeteran app – in line with the single Services emerging HR platforms. With a degree of faith in self-declaration, all the elements outlined above could be recorded, along with reporting of likely availability, benefits (pension, defence discounts, Armed Forces Covenant), and signposting to support networks. In a positive step forward, some of the single Services are now automatically ‘re-hiring’ all service leavers with a compulsory reserve liability, thereby maintaining an active employee record on the Joint Personnel Administration system. However, unless this is undertaken in a consistent manner across Defence, analysis of the totality of the Strategic Reserve will remain problematic.

Training of the Strategic Reserve is another area that can be compelled through existing RFA 96 legislation. However, Defence has not invoked these powers since 1991, and there are no legal protections or compensation packages available to employers. Employer engagement is key, along with a novel support package that enhances Defence’s relationship with industry and society writ large, rather than an employee’s reserve service being seen as a potential threat. Tax and/or National Insurance incentives for employers and self-employed, along with bolstering the Employer Recognition Scheme may be ideas worthwhile considering.

There is one rather large elephant in the room that needs addressing; that of culture and attitudes towards Defence, and reserve service in particular. We all know that recruitment and retention are problematic, typified with a net decrease of 4,430 regulars (-3%) and 1,340 reserves (-4%) in the preceding 12-months to March 24. Of the 15,730 regular forces who left in that period, over 60% voluntarily exited service before the end of their agreed engagement or commission period. According to the latest Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey, impact on Service life on family and opportunities outside the Service remain the top reasons for leaving. Whilst implementation of the 67 Haythornthwaite Review of Armed Forces Incentivisation recommendations are aimed at finding new ways to attract and retain new members of the Armed Forces, we need an honest and open debate that incorporates obligatory reserve service as part of the overall package from the outset. This includes at the point of recruitment, through regular service and as a fundamental element of a regular’s departure routine, leaving no doubt in the minds of the service leaver, their family, and future employer as to the societal obligations that comes with military service. This is clearly an easier conversation to have if the overall ‘offer’ meets expectations, the individual feels valued by Defence throughout their regular career, and they ‘leave well’.

Part II – Why do we Need a Strategic Reserve?

It is all well and good having established that there is a body of ex-serving personnel who could be called upon in time of crisis, but what do we need them for? The Army’s Future Soldier sought to identify a clear purpose for its reserve, although this was published prior to the invasion of Ukraine forcing a re-assessment. The RAF and RN may well tell us that there is no specified Service requirement, beyond that of being an undefined and unmanaged latent capability. Nonetheless, in a time of national emergency, to provide appropriate national resilience I would strongly contest that there would be a wider Defence need for some kind of additional uniformed force with at least a minimum standard of military discipline and training, capable of being armed; waiting for a potential crisis to unfold is not the time to start admiring the problem.

The Armed Forces are routinely called upon to provide military aid to the civilian authorities in reaction to events such as natural disasters, industrial disputes, terrorist activity, health epidemics and the like. The requirement for this support has not diminished. However, conventional national defence planning has gathered dust since the early 1990s following the end of the Cold War. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed the threat landscape and as part of our commitment to NATO we are required to consider how we would respond in the event of an attack, including protection of critical national infrastructure.

Consequently, former Defence Secretary Ben Wallace instigated work towards creating a National Defence and Resilience Plan (NDRP) which aims to bring greater coherence between civil and military planning in times of national emergency. With an assumption that the regular force and active reserve will already be committed to NATO during a Transition to War and potential conflict scenario, the development of a Strategic Reserve capability is fundamental to wider Defence workforce planning. Rather than a linear ‘regulars followed by reserves’ approach previously adopted, the reduced ‘mass’ held in the regular contingent will by necessity require the NDRP to consider a Whole Force approach, including concurrent Strategic Reserve activity to include force regeneration in addition to homeland defence and resilience.

Home Service Force

Of course, a UK national Defence force is not without precedent. The creation of the Home Service Force (HSF) in the 1980’s was an example of a response to detailed National Defence planning in the light of a reconsidered threat to the UK, based upon a scenario of a general war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact that would see wide scale conflict in Europe. Then, as now, the regular Army was heavily committed, and it was recognised there was a shortage of personnel to cover the growth in Home Defence tasks. Therefore, the main proposals for Home Defence fell on the Reserves. The HSF pilot scheme recruited well and was expanded nationwide, and the recruitment of trained personnel enabled units to come up to operational readiness very quickly and was highly cost-effective. Age restrictions were relaxed, and the annual commitment relatively light at around 6-10 days. In total there were about 4,700 HSF around the UK, aligned to Army Reserve centres, but with specific war roles to guard Key Point locations. They were disbanded as part of the Cold War dividend in 1992.

Scandinavian Model

The Reserve Forces Review 2030 offers insight to alternative reserves operating models. Scandinavian countries base their deterrence posture as part of a wider strategy of societal ‘Total Defence’, requiring collective preparedness. This duty to contribute extends beyond the successful Swedish policy of selective conscription to individuals, public organisations, and private companies. Service is viewed as an honourable and necessary component of citizenship. Rather than just a military endeavour, there is a collaborative approach to security planning, with business and industry leaders working alongside defence and civil contingency partners in identifying critical needs and the most appropriate way to safeguard them.

Evidently, in the UK we do not face the same degree of existential threat to our nation’s security as those European allies further East. However, the advent of technologically superior weapons such as long-range hypersonic missiles, the ever-present cyber threat, and Russia’s offensive undersea capabilities suggest that our perceived safety due to geographical dislocation is now somewhat of a moot point.

Whilst I am not an advocate of compulsory national service (as proposed by the former PM), I do believe that there is a fundamental core of society who do value the notion of service before self, outside a purely military context. The likes of the RNLI, Mountain Rescue, St John’s Ambulance, retained firefighters, through to neighbourhood foodbank initiatives and community support work. The COVID-19 pandemic which saw an unprecedented level of interest in volunteering aptly demonstrated that when the need arises, society can and will pull together out of a sense of duty. As a parent to 18- & 20-year-old sons, I’m well aware of the benefits that some kind of community volunteering or incentivised basic military training would bring, rather than the current default of racking up significant student debt with limited job prospects.

So where does the Strategic Reserve fit in amongst this melee? One skill that the military brings to the party is our ability to meticulously plan and coordinate activity. Whilst it is important to ensure that the utilisation of the Strategic Reserve should only be in support of Defence tasking, there is value in considering this through a wider pan-Government and industry lens. Organisationally, the Army’s current Regional Point of Command (RPOC) structure is aligned to the UK’s 12 International Territorial Level 1 (ITL) boundaries, with extant links to regional resilience forums; without re-inventing the wheel this would seem a logical place to start. A recent Think Defence blog provides some excellent additional thoughts on roles, equipment and organisation. Subject to appropriate investment, the ongoing Reserve Estate Optimisation programme, which aims to optimise the “Volunteer Estate” (comprising the Army Reserve Centres and Cadet Centres owned and managed by the Reserve Forces & Cadets Association on behalf of the MOD) could ensure that future infrastructure plans take a ‘one-Government’ approach by considering the needs of civil emergency services, as well as have an ability to train, equip and mobilise the Strategic Reserve at pace and scale.

To this latter point, the ability to provide adequate training and supply a basic level of kitting is paramount. Conscious of the strains already experienced by the Regular force, a blended Whole Force mix is required to generate the Strategic Reserve. A seed corn of regulars, augmented by members of the Active Reserve will need to train the non-active ex-regular cohort with a current reserve liability to an assured standard. This could also include our proposed new younger membership electing for part-time military service in lieu of community volunteering on leaving secondary education. Consideration should be given to a basic daily rate of pay and annual ‘bounty’ by way of reward for ‘keeping warm’, along with enhanced employer incentivisation. The bulk of the Strategic Reserve – those with a now-harmonised recall liability – will not be required to maintain the same degree of military skills unless volunteering to do so but would legally remain available in times of national crisis.

Conclusion

Whilst through the Command Plan, Defence has declared a Strategic Reserve, we have yet to outline a clear definition and vision of its responsibilities although this should be considered within a National Defence and Resilience Plan. A simple lexicon is required, with full alignment of single Service reserve and recall liabilities to aid understanding, both within and external to Defence. Although there may be a need to change some existing legislation, technology must be able to support the tracking and assurance of Service leavers, with ex-regulars being the primary component of the Strategic Reserve. Fundamentally, political will is necessary to instil attitudinal change towards one of total defence being a societal responsibility, including an honest articulation of the threat. The notion of public duty and citizenship will be enhanced through closer ties to public services and private enterprise embedded within the national resilience command and control structures and planning process. Of course, all this will come at cost, which will include access to kit and equipment, existing estate optimisation and an appropriate reward package for employers and reservists themselves. Time is perhaps one resource we do currently have in our favour. However, if we leave it too late to adequately prepare our Strategic Reserve then much greater cost will be incurred by society in not having a suitable force available in times of national need.

Cover photo: The Reserve Service Medal. Credit: MOD.

1. The Army Reserve, The Royal Auxiliary Air Force, and the Maritime Reserve.
2. Other age or medical considerations may apply!
3. Including, but not limited to full time reserve service, additional duties commitments, volunteer ex regular reserves and mobilised into permanent service.