Third Place (Joint)
LH(EW) Lewis Batch, Northwood HQ
It is more than 40 years since the Falklands conflict. Evaluate the challenges the Royal Navy face if it was to engage in a non-UN/NATO supported conflict in the Southern hemisphere.
Context
On 05 April 1982 the aircraft carriers HMS HERMES, HMS INVINCIBLE and their escort vessels, sailed from Portsmouth for the South Atlantic as part of the UK governments response to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. Then, as would apply now, the UK was not afforded protection under NATO’s Article 5 ‘collective self-defence’ (valid only for territories north of the Tropic of Cancer) and a solely British Military operation was initiated. Given the need to carry an invasion force over some 8,000 miles, the Royal Navy (RN) was to act as the main military apparatus in the transportation of the invasion force south: this was codenamed OPERATION CORPORATE.
Forty-one years later and Argentina has elected a new president in Javier Milie, who is keen to re-open questions over the future of the Falklands sovereignty. This, coupled with the RN’s recovery from a period of austerity-driven defence cuts, provides comparisons which are eerily reminiscent of the state of the RN in 1982. It is therefore appropriate to discuss whether the RN in 2024 could replicate a similar response to that that was launched in 1982.
To make fair assessment, the following areas will be discussed: political appetite (and foreign policy), fleet size, technology, defence procurement, as well as the UK’s relationship with her allies and the role of overseas bases.
Political Appetite
The UK government does and continues to demonstrate its desire to play a global role, meeting its commitment to international partners and defending peace and stability. This is evident from the UK’s leading role in both the training and delivery of equipment to Ukraine since 2022; the commitment through OPERATION PROSPERITY GUARDIAN to ensure freedom of navigation through areas littoral to Yemen; notwithstanding swift responses to the 2021 Kabul Airlift, the evacuation of UK nationals from Sudan in 2023 and most recently, the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza.
Importantly, it was the release of the 2021 Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper which reiterated the appetite for ‘global Britain’. This manifested itself in a commitment to respond to both concurrent and new and emerging threats, focussing largely on the following methods: the need for a more forward based Navy, the ability to deploy one functioning aircraft carrier and investment in future technology, such a direct energy weapons and artificial intelligence.
In short, the UK has demonstrated it maintains the political will to remain a global power in protecting its interests at home and abroad. However, this has been conducted with ever stretching resources, most notably, fewer available capital ships and a creaking support structure.
Fleet Size
With it established that the UK has the political will power to react to a theoretical conflict in the southern hemisphere, the next area of discussion lays with the current RN footprint and whether there is appropriate number of capital ships, auxiliary ships and supply chain to support extended deployment at high readiness.
If we compare the current RN fleet with that of the task force sent in 1982, we can see numbers are significantly lower and this has continued to decrease in size.
The OPERATION CORPORATE task group comprised of 127 ships: 43 RN vessels, (2 aircraft carriers, 15 frigates, 6 destroyers, 2 LPD’s and 6 submarines), 24 Sea Harrier and 22 Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA). The 62 merchant vessels were British-registered vessels requisitioned by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), otherwise known as ‘Ships Taken Up From Trade’ (STUFT).
In contrast, the current RN in its totality encompasses 66 vessels, drastically reducing to 21 when listing only capital ships:11 frigates, 6 destroyers, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 LPDs and 10 submarines, along with 34 F-35 aircraft and 11 RFA. Additionally, there are four Point-Class auxiliary RO/RO vessels chartered for the MoD, however, the number of British-registered vessels deemed ‘military useful’, has decreased from 841 in 2009, to 495 in 2023, signifying the depletion in national maritime resources.
The reduction in size is startling, more so when compared to the continued reduction in size from the 2010 and 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Reviews and that is without giving due consideration to the cycle of force generation required to get a vessel and her crew into an operational state. If correct, these numbers not only cast doubt on the RN’s ability to execute her national duties but demonstrate the difficulty the UK government would face in committing a task group comprising solely of RN vessels at any one time. Notwithstanding the fact that the smaller the fleet, the more acute operational defects or loss of assets (in a kinetic environment) would be felt.
It is easy to state that disparity in numbers can be counterbalanced by technological advancements in warfare, nonetheless, there is still a requirement for set number of escort vessels, submarines and auxiliary vessels to create a task force. Fundamentally, the RN has the key components to launch a carrier strike task group, as seen through OPERATION FORTIS, however, given the numerical deficiency, it would find it increasingly difficult to execute that mission, whilst honouring its core commitments: both national tasking (Continuous At Sea Deterrent, Towed Array Patrol Ship, Fleet Ready Escort) and international commitments (Combined Maritime Force Tasking 150 -154, OPERATION KIPION, Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 / 2).
Technology
The emphasis on the role of future technology is evermore playing a pivotal part of modern militaries and the RN is no exception. Fortunately, the UK is at the forefront in both concept and production, visible through the development of world leading sensors and weapons, notably the SAMPSON 1045 RADAR and associate PAAMS. Elsewhere, advances have been made in direct energy weapons, through DragonFire laser and work continues into unmanned surface / sub-surface vehicles, not to mention the equipment to be used by the Future Command Force.
Take for example the role of the Type 45 Destroyer and its contribution to air defence. The Type 45 possess a far greater capability over its predecessor (Type 42) in its sensors and weapons systems. Its PAAMS radar and Sea Viper system have proven success, as seen in their role in neutralising Houthi air attacks on HMS DIAMOND earlier this year; this reinforcing the high opinion it is held in throughout Western militaries. However, this is greatly undermined by their lack of numbers, not to mention their credibility to be put to sea following propulsion and defence procurement issues.
Within the air environment, the circumstances surrounding the F-35’s procurement follows a similar pattern. Despite boasting capability advantage over its European allies through its 5th generation technology, being so few in numbers, proceeds to undermine their warfighting capability.
Therefore, seen in its totality, the RN is a world-leader in its equipment, however again, the lack of surface vessels and equipment, seriously handicaps the ability for the RN to deploy a task group independently. Put simply, if the RN wanted to form a fleet of equivalent size to that of 1982 it would not be a task force, it would take the entire RN, leaving the United Kingdom’s entire global mission list unfulfilled. The emphasis on technological advancement and automated process over personnel and ships, goes only so far.
Defence Procurement
Of equal detriment as the lack of capital ships, is defence procurement and in real terms, that the RN and wider defence is not on a war footing. Given the requirement for more vessels (both capital and auxiliary), there is not the defence infrastructure in effective terms for ship-support, weapons-stocks and weapon-productions; invariably exacerbated both in economic (split of the defence budget) and material terms in supporting the Ukrainian war effort.
When we take for example, the issue of Type 45’s and their propulsion system, it is evident that the MoD has successfully found resolution to the issue through Power Improvement Plan the (PIP), however, this has taken time and highlighted key failings in defence procurement and support. Whilst most of these issues reside at the political level, namely the closure of British dockyards and lack of skilled workers, it has limited the capability of UK defence to produce and maintain its fleet in peacetime, let alone war, when the required output is pressing.
Similar issues are evident with the procurement of the F-35. The original order for 138 jets still exists, but now it is reported the second batch will be delayed, leaving the RN with 47 and wider defence with an aviation short fall.
Thus, a central issue hindering the ability to deploy a task group, hinges heavily on defence procurement and having the logistical shore side support. It is hoped events in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as greater public awareness of the Chinese threat – particularly the Sino-Taiwan issue – should provide government with a greater mandate to increase defence spending and assist the RN to deliver such tasks.
Allies and Overseas Bases
It is highly likely given the special relationship within the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance (FVEY) that the UK would have access to the comprehensive intelligence network, assisting the UK in its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability. Additionally, it would be hoped that FVEY allies may provide logistical and military support in-lieu of UN / NATO backing; similar to that of the Falklands Conflict, where US satellites provided signals intelligence (SIGINT) and situational awareness to British Forces.
Fortunately for the UK, the global presence of British Overseas Territories and military bases, provide a significant footprint where established military presence and support structures exist. One of the tangible outcomes of the Falkland’s War was to increase the military footprint on the Falkland themselves, providing a greater buttress to defend against Argentine aggression. Elsewhere, there is: RAF Ascension Island, British Forces Cyprus and Indian Ocean Territories, UK Naval Support Facility Bahrain, British Defence Singapore Support Unit and the presence of two Batch 2 OPV’s in the Indo-Pacific. What’s more, the Integrated Review 2021 outlined further plans to invest more in Oman (Littoral Response Group) and Singapore (OPV’s) to act as “strategic hubs” for vessels to forward operate from.
Crucially, it is the special relationship with the US and particularly in the South China Sea, the growing role of Australia, that would likely act as a key factor should conflict arise south of the equator. The emphasis on this tripartite is evident through the emergence of the 2023 AUKUS submarine deal, associate Submarine Rotational Forces-West initiative and the Australian government purchase of the Type-26 Frigate. Additionally, US and other NATO allies would likely continue to maintain defence contracts and the realpolitik of a conflict arising, would likely see armament production increase. A contemporary example of this being the gap in Surface-to-Surface capability following the expiration of Harpoon and the subsequent procurement of the Kongsberg (Norwegian) Naval Strike Missile.
Conclusion
The RN continues to demonstrate it can react to global events, protect the nations interest and challenge those who disregard the international rules-based order. However, sustained periods of defence cuts, has resulted in a RN greatly reduced in size and ever more stretched to meet its current commitments.
Based on the size of the fleet alone, it is one, if not the main challenge, should the RN wish to replicate a task group with similar ambition to that in 1982; as such, it would deprive the RN of meeting its commitment to any other tasking due to lack of vessels. Whilst the defence and technology sector can boast world leading equipment, issues surrounding defence infrastructure and defence procurement provide a further challenge to launch sustained operations. Fortunately, the UK’s relationships within alliances such as AUKUS and FVEY, as well as its overseas bases, provide strategic support should a non-UN / NATO supported conflict arise.
It is hoped wider defence will continue to acquire investment, particularly as the electorate and within that, a mandate is grown which reflects the need for further defence spending. This, however, does not resolve societal questions, namely the retention and recruitment of personnel, which lays heavily on the ability to justify a greater fleet and resultant ability to launch a task force.
Nick is a serving Royal Navy officer and has spent the last dozen years "doing logistics" in various exciting places around the globe. And Portsmouth. He is Senior Maritime Editor for the Wavell Room and is fortunate enough to have been selected as a First Sea Lord Fellow, 2022-24.