Smuggling by Sky: The New Way Terrorists Move Supplies

The Houthis

Necessity is a dark cloud that often gives birth to innovation in the turbulent arenas of contemporary conflicts. That ‘dark cloud’ – the existential threat – can act as a powerful catalyst for ingenuity, particularly in 21st-century conflicts. A very low-profile, yet dramatic form of this change is underway as terrorist and insurgent groups use commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – not just to conduct occasional attacks, but to provide a system of permanent, industrial-level resupply operations. This development makes fortified borders and patrolled roadways even more obsolete across the Sahel, to Yemen, and in South Asia. 

This is not a tactical gimmick. It is a strategic development. What started as experimental applications of shelf-storey drones has evolved into a stable aerial logistics chain that can transport 300-800 kilograms of explosives, electronic parts, munitions and vital materiel each week over hundreds of kilometres of enemy-controlled land.

Terrorist groups establish their continuous logistical ‘airborne’ pipelines using fixed-wing UAVs, each carrying payloads of 5-20kg over distances of 100-400km per flight. These drones are now built using parts that cost less than 2500 US dollars each, with jam-resistant navigation, including SpaceX Starlink ROAM terminals, that can provide satellite-based freedom even in electronically hostile environments. These operations create long-range air bridges that evade ground interdiction and exploit vast uncontrolled airspace, unlike headline-grabbing isolated attacks.

The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara

For instance, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) has wreaked havoc across the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso tri-border region in the Sahel. ISGS uses nocturnal relay chains of short-hop drone hops to ferry ammunition and IED precursors through deserts, where the use of ground troops becomes risky due to the ambushes of French-supported forces or local militias. A 2025 report by the Institute of Security Studies states that Sahelian terrorist cells, armed with Chinese-sourced commercial quadcopters as well as fixed-wing drones, acquired via Algeria and Libya, have adapted drones with longer battery life and thermal imaging. This has maintained offensive operations in remote outposts, regardless of Wagner Group patrols. This phenomenon has contributed to the UN estimate that terrorism based in Sahel contributed to more than 40 per cent of global terrorism fatalities in the first half of 2025.

The Houthis in Yemen

The Houthis have also developed the infrastructure of drone logistics, turning it into a geopolitical asset in Yemen. They launch payloads more than 300 km from mountain strongholds to reach the adjacent territory, bypassing both heavily monitored land and sea borders. In October 2025, the Pentagon evaluations and U.S. naval intercepts in the Red Sea verified the shipments of dismantled drone engines and guidance kits that were delivered in parts by UAVs. Every sortie is less than a thousand dollars, and interceptor assets are over a hundred thousand dollars, continuing the Houthi campaign against Bab-el-Mandeb shipping and disabling multibillion-dollar border walls.

Tehrik-i-Taliban in South Asia

This trend extends to South Asia, where Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) confronts Islamabad on the Durand line. Although Pakistan has maintained fencing and towers since 2017, TTP forces in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Nangarhar provinces carry out nocturnal sustainment flights of small arms, batteries and IED components directly into Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province. A recent analysis by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies recorded a 30% surge in TTP attacks this year. This escalation has forced the military to divert resources to counter-drone efforts, exposing the futility of physical border barriers against overhead supply.

Why conventional methods do not work

These instances demonstrate that the traditional method of counter-terrorism doctrine is deeply flawed, focusing as it does on conventional road movement. Aerial resupply democratises the geographical terrain, making geographical isolation an insurgent’s asset. Non-state actors stockpile equipment in ungoverned locations, launch from makeshift pads, and drop payloads far from checkpoints. Defending against this tactic is challenging and costly for counter-terrorist forces.

This dual-use proliferation has accelerated the threat. Heavy-lift motors, long-range transmitters, flight controllers and AI pathfinding software are openly available on the internet. There are various ways lethal drone technology diffusion occurs. Numerous proxies transmit drone designs over encrypted lines. Most private military companies unknowingly pass on operating instructions in the Sahel. Meanwhile, Afghan workshops from the Taliban era supply various South Asian groups. The $30 billion commercial drone market is unwittingly equipping the adversaries beyond regulatory reach.

Countering the threat

There is a need for a systemic recalibration to counter this challenge. The first step is to implement a lower tier of layered passive defence. This should include relatively inexpensive RF sensor networks in conjunction with high-power microwave systems (abstractions of the Israeli Iron Dome and the M-LIDS in the USA) to electronically intervene to destroy drones over wide areas.

The next step is to expand supply chain intelligence and implement sanctions beyond the expected 2025 U.S. Treasury levels on various networks, targeting low-end exporters and IED components, satellite modules, and advanced microprocessors. Third, liberalise export controls to give priority to so-called intellectual enablers and establish a UN convention to serialise, trace, and include remote kill switches on drones with over 100 km range. Finally, introduce mandatory use of transponders and geo-fencing in vulnerable areas, while acknowledging the expected trade-off between legitimate commercial exploitation of these areas and unregulated access by non-state actors to control airspace.

Conclusion

The skies of Sahel and Yemen and the vicinities of the Durand Line are no longer vacant and secure but are battlefields, and whoever arrives first owns it. Low-priced drones have given a significant edge to insurgents and terrorists working at a speed. Unless governments and armies can move quickly (with more advanced sensors, smarter regulation, and cheaper methods to bring down drones), they will continue to lose ground, funds, and control. In such a war, the side that adapts quickly always succeeds. States should make those adaptations now, before the sky is forever compromised.