Introduction
Since the Gaza war began nearly a year ago, Israel has conducted dozens of airstrikes against Iranian-linked targets across the Middle East. There is a widespread concern that the ongoing low-level conflict may escalate into an all-out war between the two nations. Nevertheless, Tehran, for its part, does not seem inclined to escalate into a full-scale war. There are six pivotal reasons for Iran’s strategic impasse.
Fear of a Regime Change
The first reason relates to Tehran’s prioritisation of regime preservation. Iran knows that the Islamic regime itself may become the primary target for removal in a conflict. Iran’s economy is strained due to long-standing sanctions and domestic economic challenges. A direct conflict with Israel would worsen Iran’s economic troubles. Moreover, ethnic minority groups within Iran, such as the Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, and Baluchis, have long been exasperated with the Iranian regime and there is a genuine risk that Israel may engage with these groups.
Potential US Involvement
A second factor is that a war between Iran and Israel would likely draw the United States, Israel’s historic ally, into the war. The power asymmetry between the US and Iran is striking. The US stands unmatched in its capabilities. Conversely, Tehran’s efforts to modernise its conventional forces have yielded limited success due to the country’s defence economics problems.
Regional Interests
Tehran’s direct war with Israel would certainly jeopardise its regional interests. Iran strongly emphasises advancing its sectarian geopolitical ambitions within regions traditionally considered part of the Iranian/Shia sphere of influence. A direct conflict with Israel could potentially provide opportunities for Saudi Arabia, a key antagonist seeking to counter Iran’s growing influence in the Middle East, and its allies to exploit the situation to their advantage.
Strategic Culture
The Iranian army has not faced a large-scale war since the Iran-Iraq war. The bitter experience of the war with Iraq led Iran to move away from conventional warfare tactics. Iran has opted for asymmetric strategies instead of engaging in a direct war with its adversaries. Iran supports Hezbollah, Houthis, and Hamas due to their shared objective of opposing Israel. This allows Tehran to pursue its objectives while minimising the risk of direct and large-scale retaliation from Israel. The relative success of these methods has reinforced Tehran’s commitment to an indirect approach.
Nuclear Program
The fifth reason influencing Tehran’s unwillingness to confront Israel is its progressive advancement in its own nuclear program. Iran has been enriching uranium to higher levels, developing more sophisticated centrifuges, and enhancing the range and payload capacities of its ballistic missiles. Initiating a full-fledged war against Israel would risk undermining this progress, given that it could provoke strikes on Iranian nuclear personnel and facilities.
Winning Strategic Battle of Perception
The last point worth mentioning is Tehran’s belief that engaging in a direct confrontation with Israel would eventually benefit Israel at a time when global opinion is turning against it due to the significant civilian casualties and suffering in Gaza. In contemporary wars, military victory is no longer solely defined by battlefield success, as in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict. It is possible that Israel could face a similar destiny in Gaza. Therefore, Iran is very likely leveraging Israel’s aggressive response against Hamas to undermine Israel’s and, by extension, the United State’s credibility.
What Might Come Next?
Iran is confronted with a challenging situation: it must find a way to respond that upholds its reputation while mitigating the risk of escalating to full-scale war with Israel, a scenario in which Tehran stands to lose more than it stands to gain. Choosing inaction or a feeble response could erode the domestic unity of the Iranian regime. Iran’s deterrent capacity would also be significantly diminished and potentially invite further Israeli strikes. Iran’s portrayal as the front-runner of the self-styled ‘axis of resistance’ among its regional allies, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Houthis, would also be tarnished. On the other hand, despite the need for a strong response, as noted above, Tehran is aware that such action would spark a wider conflict, something it has long sought to avoid.
While it remains unclear what steps Tehran may take in reaction to the Israeli intensified airstrikes against Iranian-linked targets, it might be expected that it will somehow attack Israeli interests. There are two main ways in which Iran may retaliate against Israel: ‘intensified’ hybrid warfare activities and limited missile or drone strikes.
More Proxy Warfare?
Iran has a long history of employing hybrid warfare against Israel. Proxy warfare, covert action, and threat of force have been critical components of the Iranian hybrid warfare strategy. In reaction to intensified Israeli airstrikes against Iranian-linked targets, one may expect that Iranian hybrid warfare operations against Israel will reach a new and more violent phase. Iran may orchestrate a series of coordinated attacks against Israeli targets through its armed proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.
Beyond hybrid warfare actions, Iran may choose a more direct form of retaliation by launching missile or drone strikes aimed at Israeli interests both within Israel and abroad, as in April 2024. Such a bold move would serve as a symbolic gesture showcasing Tehran’s capacity to retaliate. Nevertheless, the scale of direct Iranian attacks would likely remain limited due to the potentially catastrophic consequences.
Conclusion
Over the past several months, the conflict between Israel and Iran has become increasingly intense and violent. Nevertheless, despite the increasing concerns about a full-scale Israel-Iran war in recent months, Tehran has several reasons for avoiding such a war. This suggests that a full-blown Israel-Iran war is still less likely than many think. Iran’s strategic impasse means that the conflict between the two nations will persist within the grey zone between war and peace, at least in the next few months.
Tarik Solmaz
Tarik Solmaz holds a PhD in Strategy and Security from the University of Exeter. His PhD
thesis, 'Rethinking the Concept of Hybrid Warfare: A Revisionist Perspective' provides a
critical re-evaluation of hybrid warfare, examining both the concept and its practical
applications. From 2014 to 2018, he served as a security analyst in the Undersecretariat of
Public Order and Security (Turkey). Dr Solmaz has written on security issues for RealClear
Defense, Small Wars Journal, LSE Blog, Lowy Institute.