Ukraine’s Brigade level Commercial Approach

The Russo-Ukrainian War is a crucible of modern military innovation and has seen adaptation at
every echelon, which the British Army is seeking to learn lessons from. In particular, the
emergence of brigade-level commercial contracting within the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has
captured the imagination of its commanders. However, such an approach has inherent
opportunities, risks and consequences. Ultimately, a Ukrainian brigade is not analogous to a British
one and the Army has higher echelons of capable Division and Corps headquarters. Through a
blended approach, these can serve to manage a system of ‘decentralised’ commerical contracting
whilst mitigating the risks of tactical and institutional fragmentation. The British Army has to be
discerning in which lessons it chooses to learn and adapt from.

Over the course of Russo-Ukrainian War, beginning with the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and
through the full-scale invasion in 2022, the AFU has “radically pivoted its approach to military
innovation” and evolved a dual-track scheme to develop and procure military technologies. On the
one hand, it operates a ‘centralised’ system orchestrated by the Ukrainian government and AFU
command headquarters. This principally coordinates the flow of western-supplied equipment and
seeks to manage sovereign industrial output. On the other, a ‘decentralised’ system has evolved
with individual AFU brigades working directly with the commercial sector. By this latter approach,
technology and equipment moves from factory to frontline at ever increasing speeds but this
comes at the detriment of force standardisation and integration.

This decentralised model of brigade-level procurement is attractive for those seeking to address
criticisms of the MOD’s “sluggish procurement processes”. But the question is not whether to
replicate the entire approach, which emerged from existential necessity to meet specific
operational conditions, but rather to discern which elements might be adopted. The goal being to
enhance MOD procurement without undermining the coherence that British industry and military
requires. To do so it must understand the genesis of the AFU’s brigade-level procurement model,
consider the relative weight of opportunities vs risks and adapt them to Britain’s own unique
context.

Origin Story

The Ukrainian state in 2014 lacked sufficient funds to address its force’s equipment deficits and
regenerate units, which saw private citizens from across civil society fill the gap. This social
phenomenon accelerated in February 2022 as numbers joining the AFU increased, with many of
the new soldiers bringing significant personal wealth and business resource with them into service.
Commerical enterprise and industrial companies became intertwined at the lowest tactical levels
with frontline units. These in turn – which until recently were the largest AFU tactical formations –
developed an entrepreneurial attitude to procurement.

Thus emerged the ‘decentralised’ approach evident today. It grew organically to bypass traditional
bureaucratic channels to enable speed of delivery and embed battlefield feedback into industrial
procurement cycles. Critically, it also emerged in the absence of functional headquarters (for
example Division and Corps) between the brigades and the AFU central command. The system
was neither designed nor deliberate and as a result capacity varies across brigades. This is
because of three fundamental tensions: tactical agility vs force standardisation; operational
responsiveness vs industrial sustainability; and strategic mobilisation vs coherent force design.

Tactical Agility vs Force Standardisation

Brigade contracting has delivered a procurement cycle measured in days rather than months and
years. Ukrainian forces can get drones, communications equipment and logistics enablement with
unprecedented speed, allowing them to respond to Russian Forces in near-real time. CEPA noted
the AFU’s “response to the logistical challenges of Kyiv’s war of attrition” in “allowing army officers
to order kit they need, when they need it, has revolutionised Ukrainian procurement and improved
supply at the front”. This responsiveness has proven particular crucial for ‘near surface’ drone
operations, where technological advantages prove fleeting and attrition rates are high.

Unavoidably, these tactical advantages create tensions with force standardisation. Independent
procurement fragment inter-unit technical standards and their interoperability. When adjacent
brigades field incompatible drone and communications systems it manifests in reduced information
sharing, congested logistics and degraded combined arms coordination. Ukraine’s Defence
Procurement Agency has attempted to address this fragmentation by issuing an approved
suppliers list for FPV drones, establishing baseline specifications and quality standards that all
brigade-procured systems must adhere to. This intervention represents a partial recentralisation
that acknowledges the coherence costs of wholly decentralised acquisition.

Operational Responsiveness vs Industrial Sustainability

Increasing procurement tempo generates industrial strain that threatens sustainability. Myriad
brigades contracting simultaneously with Ukraine’s limited defence-industrial base creates
competition for scarce production capacity. This generates uneven equipment availability across
the front, with the most ‘successful’ brigades – rated either by social media popularity or the AFU’s
‘kill point’ system – being able to procure equipment whilst others face shortages. The competitive
dynamic fosters rivalries that can complicate tactical cooperation when brigades view each other
as competitors for limited resources rather than partners in a unified campaign. NATO officials
have observed that Ukraine’s innovation arms race underscores the need for “faster production of
weapons in significant mass amid a race to develop new technology through constant innovation”.
Tacit acknowledgement that procurement agility, without industrial capacity to fulfil demand, is
unsustainable.

Despite the prevalence of direct brigade-industry relationships there are efforts to deliver partial
centralised oversight. Ukrainian digital platforms such as DOT-Chain Defence and Army+ have
sped-up procurement, enhanced transparency and enabled rapid scaling to mitigate “a fragmented
technological landscape”. DOT-Chain Defence was piloted amongst ten AFU brigades in July 2025
as “a digital weapons market” that allowed units to order direct to the frontline. So-called ‘Battlefield
Amazon Delivery” provided a “clear and direct mechanism” for industry to interact with military units
and also recorded transactions, making corruption forensically traceable. Smaller commercial
systems including drones, electronic warfare equipment and communications systems are
procured directly by brigades based on a cost threshold. Whilst the majority of larger platforms
such as armour, artillery and air defence capabilities are brought under control of the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defence. Though there are some brigades and even regiments that have their own
armoured vehicle factories.

Strategic Mobilisation and Force Design Coherence

At the strategic level, brigade contracting has mobilised Ukrainian society and industry with
remarkable effectiveness. Defence innovation hubs created in “garages and workshops across
Ukraine”, often by civilian engineers and technology entrepreneurs, have developed systems that
are integrated across the AFU. This distributed ecosystem enhances civil resilience by dispersing
critical defence production away from centralised facilities vulnerable to Russian strikes. The model
demonstrates how decentralisation can harness whole-of-society defence, embedding innovation
into a national industrial structure.

This strategic mobilisation effort has created meaningful AFU advantage on the battlefield but
generates tension with a coherent force design. Decentralised brigade procurement optimises
individual formation capabilities without regard for force-wide integration. The ability to mass
effects and combat power deteriorates even as individual unit capabilities improve, creating
vulnerabilities along the frontline which Russian forces can exploit to breakthrough. A military force
represents more than an assembly of equipment; it constitutes an integrated system in which
capabilities need to be combined according to doctrine, training and organisational structures to
generate compound effects greater than individual components working in isolation. Innovation
cannot be sustained if decentralised procurement erodes holistic force design.

Implications for British Army Procurement Reform

Ukraine offers principles rather than templates for British Army procurement reform. Britain’s
operates within NATO structures requiring alliance interoperability and has different threat
scenarios. Political constraints such as parliamentary oversight and peacetime fiscal rules are also
factors that limit Ukrainian-style procurement flexibility. These differences matter as they determine
which lessons can and should transfer.

A blended ‘centralised / decentralised’ model across brigade, division and corps headquarters
would balance technological agility with force design coherence. Procurement cycles for
commercial equipment can be condensed by creating a centralised ‘approved supplier framework’
that enables brigades and even units to procure directly within defined parameters and cost
thresholds. Capabilities should be categorised according to their rate of battlefield obsolescence;
software needs to be adapted quickly whilst hardware endures longer. Soldier-scientist feedback
loops can be institutionalised through regular exercise and operational testing such as Post Activity
Reports being released to industry partners. Digital procurement platforms such as Army+ and Dot
Chain can be developed to catalyse delegation mechanisms. Divisional and Corps headquarters
can oversee standardisation by retaining oversight controls of training, doctrine and larger
equipment programmes.

Commercial engagement must shift from episodic competitions to continuous dialogue and the
British Army needs to embrace a cultural mindset shift in doing so. Suppliers need to understand
the Army’s requirements to scale production capacity proactively, the Army needs to engage and
be comfortable ‘letting them in the tent’.