Multi Domains Operations and India (Part 1)

In this first article,  the author outlines the development and concepts that surround Multi Domain Operations.  In Part 2, she will examine the importance of Multi Domain Operations to India’s military.

Abstract

Multi-domain operations (MDO) have emerged over the past few years to meet the demand for dynamic operations that integrate military capabilities across rapidly developing operational domains.  MDO fuse new structures with innovative technology to compensate for vulnerabilities and weaknesses in certain areas whilst leveraging strengths in others.  It is important to bear in mind that MDOs are conceptually distinct from joint operations.  They emerged as a response to the Anti-Access model of warfare, informationsed warfare and to contest the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS).  MDO are increasingly important as the space and cyberspace domains evolve beyond their original functions as mere enablers of the traditional domains.

India’s threat vectors emanate from China and Pakistan, both of whom have adopted hybrid and asymmetric warfare techniques.  We also need to add China’s Unrestricted Warfare; often referred to as a ‘Cocktail Style’ approach that merges various methods of warfare including access-denial warfare.  India is likely to become involved in multi-domain conflicts in the future where its armed forces will need to present their adversaries with multiple threats across the range of domains.

This research paper attempts to analyse the evolution and function of MDO, to assess the geopolitical context for leveraging MDO for national security, and to critically evaluate the impact of MDO on India’s national security.

Introduction

The twenty-first century has already witnessed immense levels of technological development and innovation as well as a rise in the intensity of interaction between new non-geographic and non-kinetic domains, as well as the electromagnetic spectrum.  The evolution of battlefield dynamics propelled by this technological innovation reinforces the need to develop and implement MDO.

Nations need to guard their own borders and protect their own hinterland whilst at the same time acquiring an advantage/competitive edge over their adversaries.¹ On a related note, MDO epitomise, and are part of, the recognition that disruptive technologies are now the norm in the modern era and will transformation the character of warfare.

Hybrid threats, as defined by Hoffman are used by an adversary to achieve its aims through the simultaneous and tailored use of conventional weapons, terrorism, asymmetrical manoeuvre, and illicit activities across different domains are proliferating.² We also need to bear in mind that whilst many of these activities are not new, their threat is significantly enhanced by the use of technologies such as artificial intelligence and hypersonic weaponry.³

MDO are intended to achieve a temporary superiority over a competitor through the simultaneous exploitation of several complementary attack vectors across different domains.  Each one of these threats triggers a response from an adversary which can then be exploited further.  MDO also have a strategic and an operational depth designed to isolate an opponent’s forces on the battlefield and prevent them from being reinforced.  The key to real success in MDO however, is a command-and-control system that allows multi-domain interoperability in integrated joint forces for future cross theatre dominance.

The Evolution and Function of Multi-Domain Operations – AirLand Battle

The impact of MDO has been compared with America’s post-Vietnam era reforms which centred on Active Defence.⁴ and subsequently on AirLand Battle.⁵ Naturally enough, AirLand Battle doctrine focused on the Air and Land domains with any conflict taking place in a relatively restricted physical expanse⁶ A crucial element of AirLand Battle was the need to isolate and target an enemy’s follow-on forces before they entered the forward area.⁷ AirLand Battle was a seminal doctrine.  Its conceptual strength saw the emergence of dual domain integration in not just capabilities, but strategy, organisational structure, equipment, and the training of the armed forces.⁸

A Further Evolution – Air Sea Battle

As seminal as AirLand Battle may have been, it was a doctrine very much of its time.  As the operational domains developed, it became clear that they were no longer constrained to the conventional ‘physical and electromagnetic’ classifications.⁹  This was instrumental in the development of the concept of Air Sea Battle (ASB) which is widely considered as the precursor to MDO and is seen as the natural progression from joint warfighting.¹⁰  ASB acquired its decisive edge by incorporating what were at that stage the emerging domains of space and cyberspace with the three traditional domains of air, land and sea.

ASB also focused on the need to conduct strikes designed to penetrate, degrade, disintegrate, or destroy an enemy’s forces at range.¹¹ ASB immediately recognised the need to operate across the global commons to overcome the barricades erected by Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems that would otherwise threaten any freedom of manoeuvre.  Away from the battlefield, ASB also sought to foster institutional change in the military as well as better alignment in different branches of the armed forces.¹² This last part is not as eye-catching as the warfighting aspects of ASB, but it is an essential element if operations are to be synchronised across every domain, rather than focusing on single service objectives.¹³

Although ASB was another positive step on the journey, the world had turned once more.  The return of persistent strategic struggle has led to a prolonged competitive arena that comprises ‘competition short of war’.¹⁴

Enter Multi Domain Operations

ASB then has been usurped by the need for a ‘globally postured joint force’ that can rapidly merge its own capabilities with partner nations who will then operate across not just domains and borders, but organisations.¹⁵ It is important that these capabilities can transform and adapt with far greater speed than conventional forces. The key areas earmarked enhanced integration lie with Command and Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) .  This will allow those in command of MDO to make effective command and control decisions and to pressure an adversary across multiple competitive domains.¹⁶

What Exactly is a Domain?

A domain has been defined as a ‘critical macro manoeuvre space whose access or control is vital to the freedom of action and superiority required by the mission’.¹⁷ The key aspects here relate to gaining access to and manoeuvring within the domain as well as the ability to gain control of the domain against a competitor or an adversary.

The concept of domains is clearly central to MDO, which focus on an integrated force where all branches of the armed forces can thwart and neutralise an adversary in each domain.  As an operational concept, MOD will or should also have a much wider impact across Defence; influencing procurement decisions and impacting the selection and training of personnel.¹⁸

From an American perspective, MDO are being given greater emphasis through an increasing realisation that likely opponents or ‘near peer competitors’ are inching ever closer towards technological parity with or even dominance over the United States.  Since the first Gulf War, these potential adversaries have observed and learned that American battle prowess draws a considerable degree of its strength from technological integration and innovation.  Their progress has begun to nullify America’s strategic-military advantages and are threatening to limit their previously unchallenged level of access.¹⁹

The Challenge of Unrestricted Warfare

Perhaps it is the development and progress of China’s ‘unrestricted warfare’ which has led the US to invest in the development, assimilation, and ultimately the deployment of MDO.²⁰ Unrestricted Warfare, which has been described as warfare which ‘transcends all boundaries and limits’, was an unambiguous riposte to the prevailing Western defence thinking.  A genuine threat to a range of militaries who considered warfare to be a quick and intense activity, where technology could be used to crush an opponent in remarkably short periods of time.²¹

The proponents of unrestricted warfare were focused on the evolution of warfare towards the employment of all the resources that were available encompassing both defence and civil resources where the combat zones would be ‘virtually infinite’,²² and were likely to involve ecological, economic, trade, legal, cultural, Intelligence, Information, Cyberspace, Electronic Warfare, and Space (I2CEWS)[iv] spheres.²³ Unrestricted warfare has also removed conventional rules of engagement.

The response to unrestricted warfare requires improved strategies, superior deterrence-based abilities together with a renewed focus on defence.²⁴ The importance of developing these capabilities becomes even more critical as we see the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) transitioning from a purely platform-based approach towards cyber-empowered warfare, where platforms are connected through networks.²⁶ Irregular warfare is enabled through technological advances which further enable warfare including in the cyber and information domains.²⁷

Hybrid warfare blurs the traditional division between conflict and peace by incorporating the entire array of the tools of statecraft.  The scale and types of forces needed to counter hybrid war generates a series of interdependencies between different branches of armed forces.

MDO are essential to ensure defence preparedness in face of multiple threats.  MDO are also able to assist in achieving ‘temporary superiority’ due to being logistically self-sufficient in each domain and through holding on initiative to overpower the opponent’s decision-making procedure.²⁸ Furthermore, the benefits in a particular domain can then amplified and used to generate constructive as well as possibly cascading influences in other domains.

Additionally, the development of a ‘modern system’²⁹ of warfare and ‘extended battlespace’³⁰ have similarly become a critical step towards the development of MDO.  The modern system of warfare is a closely interconnected intricate web of obscurement, camouflage, diffusion, and containment at the ‘tactical level and depth, and deferential concentration at the operational level of war’.³¹ The objective has been to seek out vital nexuses and bonds of military-operational structures to target the entire system which would be a prerequisite for strategic success.

Concerns over MDO

There are understandable apprehensions regarding MDO.  Operating through different domains will make relationships across defence far more complex.  The multiple interactions within MDOs can make it difficult to fully comprehend the innumerable effects and outcomes that happen due to the simultaneous events taking place.  Artificial Intelligence plays a key role in MDO and this means that commanders who prefer a ‘human in or on the loop’ may find it challenging to recognise and have confidence in the outcomes of the algorithms.  Current problems with the reliability of current AI technology means that the emergence of MDO could and should act as a catalyst for a greater opportunity in data compilation which might as well extend to data applicability.³²

The incorporation of disruptive technologies that give MDO an edge are a double-edged sword. They are also seen as transforming anthropocentric structures into ‘socio-technical’ organisations that are facilitated by big data, robotics, LAWS, integrated human-agent forces, machine learning and AI.³³ There is certainly an in-built reluctance to accept the role and pre-eminence of machine learning over the long established and familiar process of military decision making where the Commander’s decision holds sway.  This sort of attitude could well have an impact on the success of MDOs.  The attitude towards AI and technology has to change; it is almost inevitable that the reliance on non-human intervention will only increase.

Debates have also been focused on the fact that MDO are subject to the political orientations and policies assisted by modernised military which can offset any gains made by joint forces through the use of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting command and control, and stand-off precision strike.³⁴ These vulnerabilities can be used by the enemy to achieve a successful first strike. However, armed forces capable of MDO can take countermeasures and avoid incoming fires whilst at the same time consolidating gains through credible forward aggregation along with robust combat formations, expansion of inter-organisational and transnational abilities to generate momentary spaces of dominance traversing assorted domains.³⁵ These advantages can be further enhanced through the use of successive synchronised operations to gain a cognitive edge over the enemy forces.³⁶

Is there an Alternative?

It is perhaps easier to look at the alternative to MDO which can be seen as nothing more than a series of unconnected operations which present at best a fragmented threat to an adversary whilst at the same time still challenging our current C2 capabilities.³⁷ MDO offer several advantages which this alternative does not. This includes improvements in C2 to provide commanders with the greatly enhanced situational awareness, allowing them them to operate effectively irrespective of the prevailing uncertainty, chaos and conditions. This advantage also extends to a faster decision-making process that gets inside an adversary’s observe–orient–decide–act (OODA) loop cycle thanks to the seamless integration of the different branches and functions of the armed forces.³⁸

MDO thrive on and in many ways are reliant on technological improvements.  This is also true of any strategy being introduced by an opponent and this, if nothing else, should accelerate the demand for a fresh operational framework that encompasses the operational domains at the strategic, tactical and operational levels.³⁹

The Three Tenets of MDO

The ascendance of MDO has also led to an enhanced focus on the three tenets which underpin them: convergence, a calibrated force posture, and multi-domain formations.  Convergence has been defined as ‘as rapid and continuous integration of capabilities in all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and information environment that optimises effects to overmatch the enemy through cross-domain synergy and multiple forms of attack all enabled by mission command and disciplined initiative’.⁴⁰

The tenet maintains that via ‘cross-domain synergy, layered options, and mission command’, the armed forces stymie the adversary in aspects that are only feasible in MDO and not in single domain alternatives.  Additionally, commanders are required to build mechanisms and processes that assist in the management with ‘increased span of control of a diverse collection of capabilities’ while knitting them together for better harmonisation. matrix.⁴¹

The next tenet pertains to a calibrated force posture which has the ability to operate in decentralised/dispersed groups and benefits from access to strictly controlled national capabilities that provide better competitive advantage against an opponent.

The final tenet is that of the multi-domain formation which is centred on the belief that armed personnel are likely to accomplish better resolutions through the utilisation of AI, ‘machine learning, support systems, and biotechnical sensors’.⁴² There is however a need to develop a series of mechanisms and processes that are vital to execute decisions across multiple domains and capabilities.  On top of this, we have to recognise that there are constraints in attempting to introduce even a basic level of standardisation in the areas of doctrine, organisation, training, material, leadership, education, personnel, and facilities.⁴³

The Need for Thinking Differently

We can see that MDO are changing and challenging conventional thinking by integrating new technologies into traditional strategies and tactics across the operational domains.  MDO are also highlighting the need for multidimensional and multi domain thinking with technological innovation as the mainstay rather than the exclusive focus on conventionally informed strategies and tactics.⁴⁴

The impact of disruptive technologies such as autonomous and uncrewed systems; robotics; nanotechnology; virtual, augmented and blended reality; hypersonic weaponry; quantum technologies; additive manufacturing; biotechnology, as well as AI and big data analytics are only adding to scope and components in the rivalry amongst geopolitical adversaries.  These technologies are dependent on cyber and space domains for assets for access in a progressively challenged global commons.⁴⁵

International Collaborating across the Domains

MDO can also have an international aspect.  This makes the concept extremely versatile and highly effective in a rapidly evolving battle scenario.  Notably, discussions and debates burgeoning around MDO indicate the potential of constant amalgamation of skills available to the defence forces which can transverse the entirety of every domain for maximum gains.  MDO are also essential as an option for commanders as they provide a mechanism for the implementation of consecutive, fast, synchronised and swift manoeuvres.

MDO have begun to emerge as revisionist powers seek to utilise the changing operational environment to achieve their aims without crossing the threshold of armed warfare.  This includes using non-lethal methods to induce a stalemate and the use of precision strikes to rupture traditional partnerships, coalitions and alliance structures.  These ruptures are designed to produce instability and uncertainty to inhibit and slow down the pace of detection, assessment, and response to the threats posed by emerging powers.

Furthermore, the hybrid nature of warfare that is being undertaken by such revanchist powers are intended to accomplish their ambitions through the use of conventional armed forces, diplomatic moves, economic arrangements coupled with unconventional conflict⁴⁶ in addition to cognitive warfare.⁴⁷ Alongside the rise of new powers, the proliferation of concepts such as anti-access and area denial systems mean that an integrated approach by all branches of a nation’s armed forces is essential.⁵⁰ Japan, whose Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2019-FY 2023) referred to preparations for a Multi-Domain Defence Force that will meld proficiencies in every domain is doing likewise’⁵¹

One important concept underpinning MDO operational framework is that of the ‘dilemma’ which have been referred to as being fundamental to competition.⁵² Dilemmas arise when an adversary is forced to make a difficult choice between two or more options, especially when each option is equally undesirable.  MDO and the joint force can help achieve competitive advantage over a near-peer adversary by presenting multiple complementary dilemmas that each require a response, thereby exposing adversary vulnerabilities to subsequent dilemmas.  It is the artful combination of these multiple dilemmas, rather than a clear overmatch in terms of any particular capability, that produces the desired outcome.

Furthermore, technological advances likewise boosted forth the progress of weapon systems along with weapon platforms which have been devised to be deployed and function in domains which might in the past have been counterintuitive.⁵³ This evolution has immense bearing on policy, instruction in addition to future force engagement patterns particularly in a multipolar world with immense great power competition.⁵⁴

In Part 2, we will examine the threats faced by India and how it must adopt MDO to counter them.

 

 

 

 

 

1. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Marine Corps, United States Army White Paper, Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century, (Virginia: United States, 2016). Available on the Internet
2. Francis Hoffman, “Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges”, PRISM, Vol No. 7, Issue No. 4 (2018). URL: https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1680696/examining-complex-forms-of-conflict-gray-zone-and-hybrid-challenges/,accessed on November 22, 2020
3. Kimber Nettis, “Multi-Domain Operations: Bridging the Gaps for Dominance”, Sixteenth Air Force (Air Forces Cyber), December 28, 2020, URL:https://www.16af.af.mil/News/Article/2112873/multi-domain-operations-bridging-the-gaps-for-dominance/, accessed on December 13, 2020.
4. Jeffrey W. Long, “The Evolution of U.S. Army Doctrine: From Active Defense To Airland Battle and Beyond”, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1978 https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a241774.pdf, accessed on January 7, 2020.
5. Douglas W. Skinner, “Airland Battle Doctrine”, Strike and Amphibious Warfare Research Department, September, 1988, URL: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a202888.pdf, accessed on December 24, 2020.
6. Shmuel Shmuel, “Multi-Domain Battle: Airland Battle, Once More, With Feeling”, War on the Rocks, June 20, 2017, URL: https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/multi-domain-battle-airland-battle-once-more-with-feeling/, accessed on November 16, 2020.
7. Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle, Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges Weapons, (Washington, D.C.: United States, 2013). Available on the Internet.
8. Stephen J. Townsend, “Accelerating Multi-Domain Operations Evolution of an Idea”, Army University Press, September-October 2018,URL: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2018/Townsend-Multi-Domain-Operations/, accessed December 10, 2020
9. Manabrata Guha and David J. Galbreath, “The Multi-Domain Battle Concept: A Preliminary Assessment”, Centre For Joint Warfare Studies (New Delhi), October, 2018, URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334451700_The_Multi-Domain_Battle_Concept_A_Preliminary_Assessment, accessed on November 30, 2020.
10. B.J. Armstrong, “The Shadow Of Air-Sea Battle And The Sinking Of A2ad”, War On The Rocks, October 5, 2016, URL: https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/the-shadow-of-air-sea-battle-and-the-sinking-of-a2ad/, accessed on December 14, 2020.
11. “A Summary of Multi-Domain Operations”, New America, URL: https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/army-and-multi-domain-operations-moving-beyond-airland-battle/a-summary-of-multi-domain-operations/, accessed on December 1, 2020.
12. n. VII
13. n. VII.
14. Sascha Dov Bachmann, Andrew Dowse and Hakan Gunneriusson, “Competition Short of War – How Russia’s Hybrid and Grey-Zone Warfare Are a Blueprint for China’s Global Power Ambitions”, Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies, Vol No. 1, Issue No. 1 (2019). URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3483981, accessed on January 25, 2021.
15. Richard L. Kugler and Linton Wells II, Strategic Shift Appraising Recent Changes in U.S. Defense Plans and Priorities, (National Defense University: Washington, D.C., 2013), p. 112.
16. Kelly Mccoy, “The Road to Multi-Domain Battle: An Origin Story”, The Modern War Institute at West Point, October 27, 2017, URL: https://mwi.usma.edu/road-multi-domain-battle-origin-story/, accessed on January 24, 2020.
17. Jared Donnelly and Jon Farley, “Defining the ‘Domain’ in Multi-Domain”, ‘Security Community'”, Draft Paper presented at the Joint Air & Space Power Conference 2019, Germany, 8-10 October 2019.
18. Congressional Research Service, Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), (Washington D.C: United States Congress, 2020). Available on the Internet.
19. Steven Metz And Douglas V. Johnson, “Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, And Strategic Concepts”, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001, URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep11225.pdf, accessed on December 10, 2020.
20. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, (PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House: Beijing,1999), p. 12.
21. XXiV Ibid.
22. n. XXiV, p. 41.
23. Kyle David Borne, “Targeting in Multi-Domain Operations”, Army University Press, May-June 2019, URL: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2019/Borne-Targeting-Multi-domain/, accessed on January 21, 2021.
24. David Barno And Nora Bensahel, “A New Generation of Unrestricted Warfare”, War on the Rocks, April 19, 2016, URL: https://Warontherocks.Com/2016/04/A-New-Generation-Of-unrestricted-warfare/, accessed on December 9, 2020.

26. And what about Hybrid Warfare?

    Another factor which has impacted the emergence of the MDO has been hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare aims to consolidate the lethality of the traditional means of war with the zeal of irregular warfare.  It does this by adopting an approach based on non-conventional and indirect means designed to thwart conventional forces by avoiding open conflict.²⁵Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Brian Nichiporuk and Thomas S. Szayna, Assessing Irregular Warfare (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. 2008), pp. 7-11.

27. Mahipal Singh Rathore, “Hybrid Warfare Challenges to the Indian Defence Forces”, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, December 12, 2020, URL: https://www.claws.in/publication/hybrid-warfare-challenges-to-the-indian-defence-forces/  accessed on December 24, 2020.
28. n. viii.
29. Eliot A. Cohen,“Stephen Biddle on Military Power”, Journal of Strategic StudiesVol. 28, Issue No. 3, (2005), URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390500137259?journalCode=fjss20, accessed on December 21, 2020.
30. Donn A. Starry, “Extending the Battlefield”, Military Review, March 1981, URL: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/online-publications/documents/1981-mr-donn-starry-extending-the-battlefield.pdf, accessed on December 14, 2020.
31. Lorris Beverelli, “The Importance of the Tactical Level: The Arab-Israeli War of 1973”,  TheStrategyBridge, November 19, 2019, URL: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/11/19/the-importance-of-the-tactical-level-the-arab-israeli-war-of-1973 , accessed on December 21, 2020.
32. Andrew Scobell, “Something Old, Something New: Continuity and Change in China’s Foreign Policy”, RAND, September 9, 2020, URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CTA774-1.html, accessed on December 20, 2020.
33. xxxvi Ibid.
34. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Capabilities Integration Center, United States Army White Paper, Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century, (Virginia: United States, 2016). Available on Internet.
35. xxxviii Ibid.
36. William S. Wallace, “Multi-Domain Operations in Context”, Association Of the United States Army, April 2020, URL: https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/publications/LPE-20-4-Multi-Domain-Operations-in-Context.pdf, accessed on January 26, 2020.
37. xl Ibid.
38. Ramesh Rai, “Multi-Domain Warfare in the Indian Context”, Military Affairs, Vol No. 13, Issue No. 5 (2019). URL: https://www.defstrat.com/magazine_articles/multi-domain-warfare-in-the-indian-context/, accessed on November 30, 2020.
39. n. x.
40. US Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028
41. “A Summary of Multi-Domain Operations”, New America, URL: https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/army-and-multi-domain-operations-moving-beyond-airland-battle/a-summary-of-multi-domain-operations/, accessed on June 3, 2020.
42. Dennis Wille, “The Army and Multi-Domain Operations: Moving Beyond AirLand Battle”, New America, October 1, 2019, URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19977.5?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents, accessed on December 21, 2020.
43. Connie Lee, “Army Fleshing Out Updated Modernization Strategy”, NationalDefense, March 26,2019, URL: https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/3/26/army-looks-to-modernize-dotmlpf-in-modernization-strategy, accessed on December 18, 2020.
44. Huba Wass de Czege, “Commentary On “The US Army In Multi-Domain Operations 2028” ”, Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, April 2020, URL: https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3726.pdf, accessed on December 30, 2020.
45. Robert B. Brown, “The Indo-Asia Pacific and the Multi-Domain Battle Concept”, Army University Press, March 14, 2017, URL: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2017-Online-Exclusive-Articles/The-Indo-Asia-Pacific-and-the-Multi-Domain-Battle-Concept/ , accessed on January 4, 2021.
46. Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Army and Multi-Domain Operations, (Washington D.C: United States Congress, 2019). Available on the Internet.
47. Oliver Backes and Andrew Swab, “Cognitive Warfare: The Russian Threat to Election Integrity in the Baltic States”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, November 2019, URL: https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/cognitive-warfare-russian-threat-election-integrity-baltic-states, accessed on November 23, 2020.
50. Douglas Barrie, “Anti-access/area denial: bursting the ‘no-go’ bubble?”, Institute for Strategic Studies, March 29, 2019, URL:  https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/04/anti-access-area-denial-russia-and-crimea, accessed on December 19, 2020.⁴⁸ As multipolarity gains ground and multilateralism is eroded, the significance of MDO as a form of cooperation is likely to gain significance.

    To that end, United States has been pivoting towards MDO and formulating plans to integrate its European allies into MDO planning.⁴⁹Jack Watling and Daniel Roper, “European Allies in US Multi-Domain Operations”, Royal United Services Institute, September 23, 2019, URL: https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/european-allies-us-multi-domain-operations, accessed on December 23, 2020.

51. Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program, Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2019 – FY 2023), (Tokyo: Japan, 2018). Available on the Internet.
52. United States Congress, Congressional Research Service, Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), (Washington, D.C.: United States, 2018). Available on the Internet.
53. “Preparing Army Forces for the Multi-Domain Battlespace”, Lockheed Martin, URL: https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/2017/preparing-army-forces-for-the-multi-domain-battlespace.html, accessed on December 21, 2020.
54. n. x.