In Defence of the Rear Area
The rear area is commonly understood to be behind the forward line of troops on a battlefield; it is part of the ‘geographic framework’ that...
Category : Concepts and Doctrine
Britain’s strategic failure: Suez Canal 1854–1882
By the time the Ever Given, a 1,300-foot-long cargo vessel, had been dislodged from its horizontal grounding on a bank of the Suez Canal in...
The Centre of Gravity: A bridge between maritime and air environments
Can strategy be universally applied in multiple theaters of war? Can we apply similar strategies in both maritime and air environments? Consider the use of...
Waving a Small Stick at China
Whenever defence reviews are published commentators tend to focus on the number of military personnel the government thinks are necessary to defend British interests. Reductions...
Legal tiptoeing: the Integrated Review, Data-Sharing, and the EU
Announced on 16 March, The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR) affirms the UK’s security-related policy decisions for the next decade....
Tempo, Cohesion, and Risk: Towards a Theory of Multi Domain Warfare
The US Army requires a modernised “theory of action” to thrive within the changing phenomenon of 21st century great power competition. At the operational level,...
The Vampire Fallacy: Virtual Reality vs Needs Based Strategies
Training to win in the urban space is one of the greatest challenges for any military. Dismounted small units are the key force within the...
Resilience and Success in Warfare
”Success is not final, failure is not fatal: it is the courage to continue that counts.” – Sir Winston S. Churchill Because the nature of...
#WavellReviews “First In, Last Out: The Post-War Organisation, Employment and Training of Royal Marine Commandos” by Paul Winter (editor)
His fundamental argument - that the RM need to separate themselves from the pack by carving a distinct defence niche and identity with a bespoke...
Featured UN Intelligence in the Balkans
The former UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammerskjold, believed that peace operations must have ‘clean hands’ and not use intelligence. For Hammerskjold, the use of intelligence would...