British Army Lethality; Becoming the Porcupine

The 2024 RUSI Land Warfare Conference’s ambition was unavoidably hamstrung by the forthcoming Strategic Defence Review announced by Kier Starmer’s incoming Labour Government. Although many strategic and operational imperatives were explored, little substance was provided on how Army doctrine will evolve, how it will be re-organised and re-equipped, what this means for industry, and how these elements will together enable the future force to deter / counter the quartet of threats posed by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. We have yet to see the Army’s revised plan resulting from 2023’s Integrated Review Refresh. We will now have to wait until at least late 2025 before a more current and meaningful blueprint is released.

This is disappointing given the current geopolitical landscape. Two years ago at the same conference, General Sir Patrick Sanders refuted the idea that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would be short-term minor skirmish. Rather, he saw it as something that could foreshadow a larger and wider European conflict. Describing it as our 1937 moment, his call to arms went largely unheeded. At this year’s Land Warfare Conference. Speeches by the new Secretary of State for Defence, John Healey, and the new CGS, General Sir Roly Walker, left us in no doubt about the gathering storm. An unequivocal warning provided by retired Ukrainian General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, now Ukraine’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, set the tone for the entire conference: “Evil has drawn near and it is out to kill.”¹

Conscious that time and resources are limited, CGS made his objective clear: the British Army needs to be able to defeat a force three times its size. To do this, he aims to double its lethality by 2027 and to triple it by 2030. The most important point General Walker made was that there is no inexorable path to war. Conflict can be avoided through deterrence. We must become the porcupine that, through an impressive array of pin-sharp quills, makes any efforts by predators to eat it so egregious that they pre-emptively decide it’s not worth the effort.

The most important quill in the UK’s defensive shield is its nuclear deterrent. But our conventional forces have been so hollowed-out over the last 14 years that there is a risk of nuclear weapons being our first and only response to unexpected aggression. However, the cataclysmic effect of a nuclear exchange makes it something we should avoid at all costs. This is why restoring conventional combat power across all three services is paramount.

If the British Army is to meet adversaries with devastating lethality, what must it do in practical terms is not yet clear, so this article aims to articulate the key initiatives that will most enhance the Army’s combat power. This is not an unrealistic shopping list of new items that cannot be afforded or delivered in two years. It represents projects already in motion or about to start and which are funded by the Equipment Plan.

One – Replace Bowman with a software-defined C4I system.

The current Bowman BCIP 5.6 C4I system is rapidly approaching obsolescence. An ongoing project, the Land Environment Tactical Communication & Information System (LEtacCIS) programme, plans to replace it via the Morpheus sub-programme. The goal is to deliver a fully digitised, open architecture, software-defined C4I system with an upgradable ecosystem able to run a wide range of third-party apps. A key advantage of a software-defined capability is that, like an iPhone, it can be upgraded on an ongoing basis to maintain system utility and integrity over time. New functionality, such as increased security, AI, machine learning, and algorithmic warfare applications, can be added incrementally with little effort or risk. An open architecture ensures interoperability with our allies. It allows increased technical functionality to be quickly rolled-out.

Unfortunately, Morpheus was derailed by the failure to deliver EVO, a component work stream intended to open Bowman’s existing closed architecture. Evolving to an open architecture was essential to ensure third-party application compatibility. The 2023 cancellation of the EVO the sub-programme has forced the Army to issue a further update to Bowman (BCIP 5.7) to buy time until a new system can be delivered.² Without an evolved version of the current architecture, the Army will be forced to buy a new open standards architecture system off-the-shelf. However, this could actually be a blessing in disguise, because several new COTS open operating systems have become available since the LEtacCIS / Morpheus programme was started several years ago. A good number of these incorporate the key capability blocks required by the Army.

Getting LEtacCIS / Morpheus back on track must be the Army’s top priority. It will enable headquarters and deployed units to share information seamlessly via voice and data. They will be able to communicate more securely, more reliably, and over longer distances. NATO armies that have already implemented software-defined C4I systems, including the USA and France, view their systems as a step-change. They are the glue that integrates multiple weapon systems. They provide a secure network that connects sensors to effectors, establishing rapid and efficient kill chains. They improve situational awareness, enabling faster, more informed decision-making. They provide powerful analytical tools for the management of repetitive, yet essential tasks. They streamline logistical planning and delivery. The wealth of information they place at the finger tips of commanders will enhance command and control and the overall effectiveness of deployed forces.

Ultimately, LetacCIS / Morpheus is what will most enable the Army to do more with less. The right system will be a force multiplier. The ingredients needed to field a next-generation C4I capability are widely available from multiple vendors. The challenge is to identify, select, and acquire the most capable building blocks as rapidly as possible. This must be the Army’s top priority.

Two – Increasing Deep Fires capabilities

If the Russo-Ukraine conflict has emphasised any previously learned lessons of modern warfare it is that artillery remains the king of battle. According to RUSI, more than 70% of battlefield casualties have been caused by artillery.³ In 2022, the Russian offensive did not make territorial gains until concentrations of artillery were employed to support combined arms manoeuvre. In 2024, ATACMS missiles fired by HIMARS launchers played a key role in helping Ukrainian forces inflict 70,000 Russian casualties in 60 days.⁴

The recapitalisation of the British Army’s M270 GLMRS has increased the fleet to 72 launchers. This is sufficient to equip two Regular Army regiments plus an Army Reserve / training regiment. The Army plans to acquire a modest fleet of 18 HIMARS launchers to augment the firepower of its light forces. This is a welcome move. Equipping 16 Air Assault and 3 Commando brigades with HIMARS would significantly enhance their lethality versus the legacy 105 mm L118 light gun. In reality, 72 launchers are needed, which would be sufficient to equip two Regular Army regiments with 24 launchers each, plus an Army Reserve / training regiment, also with 24.

The acquisition of 72 HIMARS launchers for a total of 144 GMLRS systems would definitely double the Army’s existing lethality in this area. The cost of a HIMARS launcher is approximately £4 million, or a total of £280 million for 72, but the real expense is the cost of the munitions it fires. Since the UK has already committed to investing in new GMLRS ER rockets and PrSM, this should not be an issue. However, an additional missile is needed: a ground-launched cruise missile with a 1,000 km range. This would be ideal for targeting enemy logistics nodes, HQs, and concentrations of troops in rear areas. A cruise missile swarm could also provide the overwhelming “shock and awe” firepower needed to support a counter-offensive designed to recapture lost territory.

Force lethality can be further boosted through 120 mm mortars which have a range of 10-12 kilometres versus 5 kilometres for 81 mm equivalents. There is much debate about whether 120 mm mortars can replace the 105 mm L118 Light gun. By itself, the answer is no, but used in conjunction with loitering munitions (see below) and HIMARS, definitely.

Rocket and missile artillery cannot substitute 155 mm tube artillery, which is still needed to suppress the enemy and contribute effect at a lower overall munition cost. The British Army has committed to acquiring the Boxer RCH155 howitzer in partnership with Germany to replace the AS90. The UK plans to acquire sufficient systems to equip four artillery regiments with 24 guns each, or 96 in total. It may find it needs more. If the Army plans to generate two deployable divisions with three brigades each, then six 155 mm regiments plus a training battery, for a total of 160 howitzers is probably a minimum. Again, this is a funded requirement via the Mobile Fires Programme (MFP). The challenge is put it into production as quickly as possible.

Three – Un-crewed Aerial Systems / Loitering Munitions

Un-crewed aerial systems (UAS) have lifted the fog of war. They also create significant new targeting opportunities, increase the speed of target engagement, reduce the cost of target defeat, and lower the risk of collateral damage. This makes them an extremely capable and efficient asset.

The UK has programmes of record to acquire multiple UAS and loitering munition types. New technology has seen this category evolve at astonishing speed. We are witnessing a convergence of UAS, loitering munitions and cruise missiles as the miniaturisation of hardware, particularly guidance systems and on-board processors, allows newer systems to perform the same tasks as more sophisticated and expensive ones at a fraction of the cost. For some roles, such as routine observation and surveillance, low cost drones need to be attritable like smart ammunition. For other roles, where more sophisticated sensors are needed, UAS are too costly to be expendable.

UAS are no longer a specialist capability. They need to become an organic part of every combat unit, although more advanced systems, e.g., Watchkeeper / Protector, still need to be operated by dedicated units. New loitering munition options, e.g., the Anduril Altius 600M, can carry modular payloads. This allows them to be fitted with a mix of mission-defined sensors, EW jamming devices, or anti-armour munitions with shaped-charge warheads. Although such systems need to be attritable, where they are used to find and strike the enemy, but do not find a target, they should be able to return home and be used again.

The Army needs four primary system types:

• An attritable small drone / FPV quadcopter for surveillance and strike – 5 kg payload (sensor or warhead), 30 km range, 40 minutes of endurance, 160 kph, e.g., militarised DJI Mavic Pro
• An attritable mid-size UAS / Loitering Munition for surveillance and strike – 20 kg modular payload, 100 km range, 240 minutes of endurance, 250 kph, e.g. Anduril Altius 600M
• A mid-size quadcopter with 180 kg payload, with 70 km range, 120 minutes of endurance, 140 kph, e.g., Malloy T400
• A large fixed wing UAS for surveillance and strike (able to be teamed with Apache AH64E) – 2,000 kg, 1,000 km range, 25,000 ft ceiling, 30+ hours of endurance, speed of 300+ kph, e.g. General Atomics MQ-1C Gray Eagle.

Four – Air Defence

The threat posed by the proliferation of UAS and low cost drones mandates an investment in C-UAS systems, but also an increased level of general air defence capabilities to counter combat aircraft and attack helicopters. Again, UK Land GBAD programmes of record already exist. The most important of these is SkySabre, a Medium Range Air Defence (MRAD) system that combines the CAMM / Land Ceptor surface-to-air missile, Rafael’s Modular Integrated C4I Air & Missile Defence System (MIC4AD) which is used by Israel’s Iron Dome, and the SAAB Giraffe Agile Multi Beam (GAMB) 3D radar. The improved CAMM-ER missile has recently extended system range from 25 km to 40+ km. SkySabre offers superb coverage and recently proved itself in Royal Navy service when it was used to defeat Iranian / Houthi drone and missile strikes against Israel.

The significant problem is that the Army only has a single battery of 8-12 SkySabre launch sets. It needs at least 24 and ideally 48. Though the launchers are not inexpensive, like HIMARS the cost lies in the CAMM missiles. An uplift in SkySabre systems would not only provide an air defence shield over the United Kingdom, but is an essential component of a layered and integrated air defence system for any deployed expeditionary force.

The second major Land GBAD programme will provide a renewed SHORAD capability. The plan is to mount the recently upgraded Starstreak HVM and Martlett LMM surface-to-air missiles on whatever platform is chosen for the Army’s medium protected mobility requirement (part of the Land Mobility Programme). This vehicle is needed to replace the outdated Stormer. It is expected that approximately 100 systems will be acquired. Like Javelin and NLAW, HVM and LMM have both been combat proven in Ukraine. The challenge here is to accelerate the Land Mobility Programme to deliver the desired capability quickly.

The third Land GBAD programme is a second SHORAD system that will mount a cannon on Boxer. This will be a more survivable and agile system that keeps pace with deployed armoured brigades. It is not clear what will be selected, but Rheinmetall’s SkyRanger 35 mm provides an 8-kilometre dome and is a truly world-class GBAD system. Final numbers have not been fixed, but 48 systems would suffice. Again, this is not pie-in-the-sky, but a realistic option for a funded programme.

Like purchasing HIMARs to augment GMLRS capabilities, the GBAD capabilities outlined above would dramatically increase the Army’s lethality, particularly SkySabre.

Five – Land Mobility Programme

The Army plans to acquire 148 Challenger 3 MBTs, 593 Ajax CRVs, 623 Boxer 8×8 ICVs, and, with any luck, 380 new IFVs. These combat vehicles are essential if the Army is to maintain a credible capacity to conduct combined arms manoeuvre. However, they are exquisite capabilities with long production lead times. They are also expensive, which limits the total we can afford.  Only three of the eight planned combat brigades that the Army will generate (based on the 2021 Future Soldier Guide) will be equipped with the above vehicles; so what will other deployable units be equipped with?

The Land Mobility Programme aims to provide a significant number of new protected mobility vehicles. It will condense a total of 13 different platforms into just 3: (1) General Purpose Utility, (2) PM Light; and (3) PM Medium. This will reduce training and through-life support requirements and reduce overall operating costs.

For the GP Utility category, some 7,000 Land-Rover replacements will be acquired with a significant percentage of these being an armoured variant. For the PM Light category, 3,000 of a sub-10-tonne 4×4 JLTV-class vehicles will be acquired to augment Jackal and Foxhound. And, for the PM Medium / Heavy category, 1,600 4×4 / 6×6 vehicles in 15-20 tonne weight class will be acquired to replace Mastiff, Ridgeback, and Wolfhound.⁵

Counter-insurgency deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan demanded force-wide protected mobility to survive IEDs and mine strikes. The threat has now evolved. Ukraine has shown that concentrations of enemy vehicles have become magnets for enemy artillery. For this reason, armies are adopting a decentralised approach to operations where dispersed units operating dismounted use UAS and loitering munitions to defeat enemy forces at stand-off distances. The key to survivability is to keep moving. This applies to other non-combat units, making protected mobility a universal requirement. Overall, protected mobility vehicles are not combat vehicles, but rather protected taxis that enable troops to move safely around the battlefield out of contact.

Acquired in a hurry, many PM platforms were crude armoured boxes attached to heavy truck chassis. They provided good protection but had limited cross-country mobility. Over the last decade, the category has evolved. Vehicles like the Oshkosh JLTV, KNDS Dingo, GDELS Eagle, and Thales Bushmaster represent a new class of low-cost, easy-to-support armoured vehicles that are much better off-road.

Another factor that makes this capability relevant to the challenges the Army faces today, is that any extended European conflict would see holdings of high-end armoured vehicles depleted after six months of combat. Simple armoured vehicles that are inexpensive, quick and easy to produce, like those described above, would be the only viable short-term means of replacing lost MBTs and ICVs. In other words, they are vital to ensure resilience. In summary, light and medium weight PM vehicles are a key enabler of lethality.

Six – Turreted version of Boxer

Under existing plans, the Army will acquire 623 Boxers. However, it wishes to purchase additional variants which are already funded via the Equipment Plan. Leveraging the modularity of Boxer, new versions can be created by developing new mission modules instead of a completely new vehicle. This simplifies and accelerates the acquisition process while reducing costs. In addition to the four Boxer variants already under contract (Infantry Carrier, Specialist Carrier, Command, and Ambulance), the British Army wants to field a Repair and Recovery variant, a Mortar vehicle, Bridgelayer, Mounted Close Combat Overwatch variant, SHORAD vehicle (see above), Counter Battery Radar vehicle, and Engineer variants. There is also the Boxer RCH155 Artillery Gun Module. The final Boxer fleet could well grow beyond 1,000 vehicles. This capability is entering service now with large scale deliveries expected to be made over the next 24 months. Boxer will do much to deliver CGS’s ambition by 2027.

As Boxer enters service, Warrior will be retired. This means that armoured infantry units will not have an organic medium calibre cannon-equipped vehicle to provide dismounted troops with direct fire support in the assault. This task will fall upon Ajax. But if Ajax is used as fire support platform, it cannot perform its primary reconnaissance role.

There is a strong case to develop a new Boxer mission module that mounts a turreted 30 mm or 40 mm cannon plus twin ATGM. Several medium calibre turret options have already been integrated on Boxer, so bringing something like this into service can be quickly implemented.

A Boxer cavalry vehicle with a turret may be preferable to a Boxer infantry fighting vehicle with one, because the infantry variant’s primary mission is to deliver dismounted mass. Having a turret would compromise this essential task. However, a separate Boxer cavalry variant could perform six roles: (1) Infantry direct fire support, (2) Indirect joint fires control, (3) UAS mothership for surveillance / reconnaissance tasks, (5) Loitering Munition / Long-range ATGM carrier for overwatch tasks, (6) Flank and rear area protection.

Post-2030, the Army will need a new IFV to replace Warrior. This is likely to be unaffordable before then, unless extra money can be found. Long-term, it will be an essential component to reinforce the armoured brigades’ effectiveness to conduct combined arms manoeuvre. In the short-term, adding a turret to Boxer would offset the loss of Warrior until a new tracked platform is affordable.

Summary

Much of what is described above is already happening with existing funding. The suggestions made are mostly tweaks. Above all, the Army does not need to completely change direction. To divert funds away from existing projects to chase new and unproven technologies would be an exemplar of diminishing returns.

It is very much hoped that the Strategic Defense Review reconstitutes the Army around the same number of brigades as envisaged by the Future Soldier Guide in 2021, but reconfigured as 2x armoured brigades, 2x medium mechanised brigades, 2x light mechanised brigades, an air assault brigade, and the special operations / Ranger brigade. We don’t need a separate Deep Reconnaissance Strike brigade – this role can be fulfilled by the two medium mechanised brigades. And, we don’t need 11 Security Force Assistance brigade. This role can be fulfilled by the Ranger brigade. It is hoped that the Army will be re-organised around two divisions, expeditionary and manoeuvre, supported by two artillery brigades.

The one really important change that’s needed is for the Regular Army to be deployable without relying on the Army Reserve. Let’s have infantry battalions with three proper rifle companies and at least 600 personnel. And, let’s reconstitute the Army Reserve so it can perform its proper function: (1) Driving the wider expansion of the Army as a whole, (2) Providing the basis of a second echelon force, (3) Providing battlefield casualty replacements, (4) Providing specialist personnel. I estimate that to do this the Army would need to be re-grown to a minimum of 83,000 regular personnel and ideal 90,000. This may not be affordable before 2027, but is likely to be crucial to achieve CGS’s 2030 aspirations and a wider deterrent effect.

1. Speech given at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference, July 2024
2. European Security & Defence, 15 December 2023, UK MoD cancels Morpheus EvO comms system contract https://euro-sd.com/2023/12/major-news/35641/uk-mod-kills-morpheus-contract/
3. Source: RUSI: Russia’s Artillery War in Ukraine: Challenges and Innovations, by Sam Cranny Evans, 9 August 2023, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-artillery-war-ukraine-challenges-and-innovations
4. Source: UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and Nicholas Aucott, Senior Military Advisor at the UK Delegation to the OSCE Speech in Vienna 17 July 2024: Russia must not be allowed to operate with impunity: UK statement to the OSCE https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/russia-must-not-be-allowed-to-operate-with-impunity-uk-statement-to-the-osce#
5. Source: LMP Briefing at IAV January 2024 by the DE&S Team