Reworking the strategy of strategic communication

“Achieving information dominance is an indispensable prerequisite of combat action.”

Editor’s note: This style of article is also a move from our more traditional analytical articles. However, we valued the first person experience it offers and think it is of interest to our readers.  

The current Labour government is having a hard time of it from mainstream media and with the departure of Sue Gray as the Chief of Staff at Downing Street and a budget that already seems to be unpopular. Downing Street it is going to have to work hard to reverse what has been an unsteady number of weeks in the headlines.

How can it do this and why?

I have recently returned from Operation ORBITAL (the UK presence in Eastern Europe) as the media officer. During this time I was fortunate enough to work alongside Task Force Thunder in Grafenwoehr. I saw multiple elements of the NATO effort to support Ukraine from a J4, J7 and J9 perspective. Whether that be helicopter pilot training to medical serials, the state of the art facilities being used, or witnessing the biggest movement of kit and equipment across Europe since WW2. The effort from every nation and individual involved is staggering.

But it seems that absolutely no one outside of military circles is aware of it.

When on rest and relaxation I attended two weddings. When chatting to fellow guests I was often asked, ‘Is there still a war going on?’ Why has everyone forgotten about the conflict in the Ukraine? It would be very easy to blame the 24-hour news cycle and the constant demand for new stories and viewer fatigue for the war falling down the priority list in newsrooms. I would argue, however, that poor strategic communications has also diminished understanding and interest in the conflict.

This opinion piece is focussing on strategic communications and not strategic command.

Finding the equation

When discussing the Labour Government Tony Blair’s former spin doctor, Alastair Campbell, offered a solution in the New European. Campbell offered “strategic communications, which is the simultaneous development, execution and narration of the driving strategy of government.” Campbell provides a solid definition of strategic communications and one we can work with, “create narratives, deliver narratives and sell the story.”

But how do we do it?

A simple strategy model that I have used before is one developed by Arthur F. Lykke Jr who gives us the ends, ways, and means model. Many officers will be familiar with this 3-tier framework. The formula is simple: strategy = ends + ways + means.

This gives us three simple questions to ask; What is the desired end-state? How can it be achieved? What resources are required?

The strategic communications strategy for the war in Ukraine has a well-defined end state which is to ensure continued support form the UK public for the work being done by NATO and the UK Armed Forces. The strategic talking points and lines to take are comprehensively circulated and updated as needed. We have the ways in which we wish to do this, whether that be a certain number of views, shares or likes on social media posts, headlines or column inches in traditional print, content creation from interviews and documentary series (I highly recommend watching the INTERFLEX series on YoutTube that was created by BFBS) all underpinned by narratives we design.

Where we come unstuck is the means. What resources are required to do this?

I will offer a sports analogy to help explain this. What do all premier league football teams want to do? Win the league.

I accept that small clubs merely wish to survive and some mid-table clubs just want to turn a profit. I am being reductive for simplicity. We have our end state: win the league.

The ways are the styles of football a team or how the team coach wishes to play. Some teams want a high press and to counterattack: traditionally in England we have played a long ball attritional style with passes limited to between 6-8 from goalkeeper to a strong striker up front. Or you can play a possession game. The means, then, are the players. The eleven on the pitch and the wider squad.

Now, for a well organised team, the head coach will recruit and develop (through the academy system) players (means) that fit their style of play (ways) to deliver the wins necessary to lift the trophy (ends). It will always be the means by which a coach will come unstuck because (despite being judged by ends, lifting trophies) the way you wish to play is largely dependent on two things: your ability to coach and the abilities of the players.

Poor players or limited players will determine the way in which a game is played. You may wish to play fast football using width and players making runs inside or behind the centre half but if your wing backs cannot cross a ball or time a run it is irrelevant. Your means undermine the ways and that undermines the ends. Your strategy is wrong or as Lykke Jr would say your equation does not work.

Balancing the equation

The problem, as I currently see for strategic communications within Defence, it is that we have a means issue. While having desired end states the ways in which are going to do it are often written in exacting detail that we fail to resource appropriately.

For example, whilst deployed I spent hours drafting a campaign plan which referenced J4 and J7 events across our area of operations. I wrote supporting documents explaining the purpose of the activity to the intended audience and a release timeline. With no assets myself except a smart phone and laptop in nearly every instance of media activity and engagement I had to request support from other agencies who unsurprisingly had their own outputs and priorities that they were juggling.

I was a lone staff officer asking for support to create a talking heads video to demonstrate utility to my own headquarters. To create high quality products and deliver them in a timely fashion is a struggle and not the best way to deliver effect.

In my observation, the US had a system that could be readily adopted and would not take long to integrate into the British Army. J359.

No, this is not a flight code.

This is what the Public Affairs Office (PAO) referred to themselves as they conducted a full J3-5 function for J9. The US PAO structure is an OF-5 that had three branches, media ops, psyops, visits and engagement with content creation happening for all three. Each branch had their own team with well-trained officers and experienced soldiers to conduct the planning and execution of each narrative they owned.

They also had access to influencers back in the US and in Ukraine who they used amplify the strategic narratives. This allowed a dialogue to open up between creators and consumers.

Fixing the Equation

J9 can and should directly contribute to our strategic communications and should be reverse engineered. Build the team first. This would allow practitioners, planners, and C2 elements all to work from and for the same organisation.

An Information Operations Centre with a focus on supporting the other 3-star structures in delivering J9 effects (or information warfare) is not only achievable but could be a line of development for Defence in partnering civilian talent with military effects. The Haythornthwaite Review emphasised how the Armed Forces are now competing with a broader employment market (which we cannot outspend) and there is a growing demand for rapidly developing skills, such as content creation, that the Armed Forces lack. An Info Ops Centre could be a cutting edge (and dare I say leading) department that blends civilian and military talent from inception.

In practise any operation of a certain magnitude must have a dedicated J9 team which is separate from the operational command team. This would allow freedom of movement and resource prioritisation and allow the J9 team to pursue content creation to support the strategic narratives. Furthermore, by resourcing strategic communications as a separate line of effort it would free up staff horsepower within the operational headquarters where media roles are typically seen as secondary or even tertiary duties. And in certain situations as an afterthought.

The relationship with the Commander and the J9 team would be TACOM to ensure they remain assigned to the specific task of delivering a strategic communication effect and can be deployed for bursts of activity. Operation centres should get used to hearing, “the J9ers are here”, experience minimal disruption to their workspace and working routine and then read all about it a few days later.

Living with the current equation

You cannot expect extraordinary results from ordinary efforts. If you want public support and interest around any operation to be positive and supportive of our efforts, you need more than a lone SO3 or SO2 (often with limited training) with a smart phone. We cannot expect BAFTA quality content with limited resources. Information warfare needs to be conducted throughout all phases of interstate conflict. Professor Mark Laity, known as ‘Mr StratCom’, stressed this when addressing the Riga Strategic Communications Dialogue Conference in 2018: what is key is that this is how the Russians ‘think war is fought.’

The only activity that spans all phases of conflict is the conduct of information warfare. It is right that we rework the strategy given to strategic communication and that we do so by the appropriate means. Our adversaries are doing it, and we must close the gap between them and us.

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