The views expressed in this Paper are the authors’, and do not represent those of MOD, the Royal Navy, RNSSC, or any other institution.
The transformation of the UK’s Commando Forces (CF), anchored in the Littoral Response Groups (LRGs) and the CF concept, represents an ambitious shift in British expeditionary warfare. However, its viability is undermined by structural and doctrinal disjoints that question its ability to operate effectively in contested littoral environments. Chief among these issues are: the persistent disconnect between the British Army and Royal Navy (RN); inconsistencies between UK Joint Theatre Entry Doctrine and emergent CF operational concepts; and the historical realities of military operations in littorals – especially the Baltic – which highlight the need for mass and endurance over rapid raiding.
The Army-Navy Disconnect: An Enduring Structural Weakness
CF transformation seeks to create an agile, distributed force capable of operating in complex littoral zones. However, its success is constrained by the systemic disconnect between the RN and Army. Despite their transformation into a high-readiness raiding force, the CF remains reliant on 17 Port and Maritime Regiment RLC (17P&M) for strategic lift and sustainment. Recent analysis underscores 17P&M’s indispensable role in enabling amphibious operations, yet it is a relatively misunderstood, under-resourced, and neglected capability within the broader amphibious force structure, and one that remains firmly under an Army Op Order.1
The Army’s focus on land-centric deterrence in Europe — particularly through the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and recently deployed Allied Reaction Force — suggests limited institutional buy-in for amphibious operations beyond logistical support. Ironically, it is the Army’s reliance on ‘red carpet’ port-to-port transfer of forces that underpins its continental strategy, as evidenced in the seaborne deployment of 1UK Div to Romania via Greece2 and the recent signing of a ‘strategic agreement’ with Associated British Ports to expand staging options beyond Marchwood military port.3 This absence of a unified Army-Navy vision for expeditionary warfare leaves the UK in a precarious position: a CF designed for high-intensity littoral raiding, but dependent on an Army-enabled logistics structure that remains geared towards continental land warfare. Similarly, the CF’s raiding focus risks confusing the amphibious shipping requirement by ignoring the Army’s need for logistical mass, as well as other doctrinally recognised amphibious operations such as Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief.[not
Doctrinal Incoherence: Joint Theatre Entry vs. Commando Force Operations
The UK’s Joint Theatre Entry Doctrine emphasizes securing lodgements to facilitate force build-up and follow-on operations. Historically, this has required large-scale amphibious capabilities, pre-positioned logistics, and joint enablers. Yet, the emergent CF concept of operations prioritizes distributed, small-unit raiding without a clear pathway to sustained presence or operational endurance. This is accentuated by naval-centric command and control; the CF is a maritime force element composed of naval platforms and personnel optimised to support a maritime – rather than land – campaign plan.
Critiques of raiding highlights its fundamental limitations: it is resource-intensive, difficult to sustain, and often a tactic of operational necessity rather than strategic advantage.4 While raiding can disrupt adversary activity, it cannot replace force projection or control of key maritime terrain, both of which require relative mass and sustainment. By orienting the CF around raiding without a credible joint force integration plan, the UK risks investing in a force that is tactically innovative but strategically irrelevant.
Moreover, this raises a crucial question: if the UK’s future amphibious posture is designed for raiding rather than securing and holding terrain, how does this align with NATO’s broader deterrence posture? The Baltic States and Northern Europe require reinforcement and persistent force presence, not episodic disruption operations. A force optimized for raiding risks being a peripheral player in Europe’s strategic defence framework, rather than a central contributor to NATO’s security architecture.
The Baltic Littoral: A Historical Case for Mass and Endurance
History offers clear lessons about the demands of warfare in the Baltic littoral, a region central to current UK strategic concerns. The Cold War-era expectation of contested reinforcement in Northern Europe has not changed; if anything, the challenge has intensified with the growth of Russian Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The assumption that these bastions will be dealt with by an advanced shaping force has not been adequately challenged; the lessons of 1982, where follow-on forces and materiel were attrited at Bluff Cove and aboard the Atlantic Conveyor, appear to have been forgotten. The oft-cited example of the Israeli commando action against Green Island as precedent further muddies the water and ignores the reality that the raid was part of a wider – quite literal – War of Attrition.5
The Baltic littoral is characterized by complex geography, heavily defended coastlines, and limited strategic depth. Historically, successful operations in the region — whether Swedish campaigns in the 17th century, Soviet amphibious landings in the Second World War, or NATO’s Cold War planning — relied on massed force projection, strong logistics, and a clear operational framework linking amphibious actions to broader land campaign objectives.
The UK’s current focus on light, distributed raiding forces does not adequately address these lessons. Without robust supporting elements—heavy fire support, air cover, and sustainable logistics—littoral operations in the Baltic and elsewhere risk becoming isolated and ineffective. The conceptual gap between the UK’s current CF model and the historical realities of Baltic operations – and wider littoral campaigns in general – suggests an urgent need to reconsider force composition and deployment strategies.
Conclusion: Rethinking Littoral Warfare for the UK
The CF transformation represents an effort to modernize the UK’s amphibious capability, but it risks being built on shaky foundations. The structural divide between the British Army and RN (including the Royal Marines-led CF), the doctrinal inconsistencies between raiding and theatre entry, and the historical lessons from Baltic operations all point to a need for a more integrated and sustainable approach to UK power projection.
A credible UK littoral force should bridge the Army-Navy divide, ensuring that logistics and sustainment are not afterthoughts. With a NATO first posture likely preeminent in the forthcoming SDR, aligning the UK’s amphibious and littoral strike ambition with NATO’s strategic needs is vital; it should look beyond raiding to provide persistent presence and theatre entry capability in potentially contested and denied environments. Most importantly, it must recognize that history does not favour light, ephemeral forces in contested maritime regions—it favours those with endurance, mass, and the ability to sustain the fight, as evidenced in the Falklands conflict. If these issues remain unaddressed, the UK risks developing a force that is operationally innovative but strategically fragile, incapable of delivering real impact in the contested littorals where future conflicts will be decided.
Andy Young
Andrew (Andy) Young is currently part of the leadership team at the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre, having returned to his nval roots following a period as the Military Sciences Community Manager at the Royal United Services Institute.
Prior to joining RUSI, Andrew was a Royal Navy Training Management Officer specialising in Professional Military Education. He has taught on courses at BRNC Dartmouth, Royal Marines Commando Training Centre, and JCSC Shrivenham. A regular contributor to the Naval Review whilst in-Service, Andrew also authored elements of the Royal Navy’s Maritime Doctrine Primer.
Andrew holds an MPhil in International Relations and Politics, a PGDip in Training Management and Consultancy, a BA in War Studies, and is an Associate member of the Chartered Institute of Professional Development. He is the most junior officer to have completed the Mountbatten Fellowship. His research interests include the development of Amphibious doctrine and British strategic history.
Footnotes
- Andrew Young, ‘Littoral logistics and the Importance of 17 Port and Maritime Regiment’, RUSI Defence Systems, Vol 27, January 3, 2025: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-defence-systems/littoral-logistics-and-importance-17-port-and-maritime-regiment.
- ‘Thousands of British troops to lead major NATO exercise in Eastern Europe’, Ministry of Defence, January 3, 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/thousands-of-british-troops-to-lead-major-nato-exercise-in-eastern-europe
- ‘ABP secures landmark agreement with the UK’s Ministry of Defence’, Container News, January 13, 2025: https://container-news.com/abp-agreement-with-uks-ministry-of-defence/#:~:text=Associated%20British%20Ports%20%28ABP%29%2C%20the%20UK%E2%80%99s%20largest%20port,of%20the%20UK%20Armed%20Forces%E2%80%99%20sea%20mounting%20capabilities.
- Andrew Young, ‘The Strategic Utility of Raiding’, Wavell Room, May 16, 2023: https://wavellroom.com/2023/05/16/the-strategic-utility-of-raiding/
- ‘The War of Attrition: The Israeli Commando Assault on Green Island (July 1969), Jewish Virtual Library. Accessed February 7, 2025: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-israeli-commando-assault-on-green-island-july-1969