On 22 June 2022, Ukraine launched its first known strike into Russia with a One Way Attack (OWA) Drone. The drone itself, likely a weaponised civilian model, struck an oil refinery in Rostov, causing a massive fire and lasting damage to the facility.
Two years later, Ukraine’s OWA drone attacks are so frequent that they seem unremarkable. On 18 May Ukrainian drones struck another oil storage facility in Rostov. This attack came less than a week after strikes on a metallurgical plant and Russian fighter base. Russia’s refineries, airbases, industrial facilities, and the facility involved in Russia’s own OWA drone production have all been successfully targeted. The problem is serious enough that Russia has diverted precious air defence assets and installed ad hoc solutions like nets and barrage balloons around their facilities and cities.
OWA Drones – a blind spot for some
The threat posed by OWA drones is that they are a blind spot for many policymakers and scholars. They assume that because these drones are cheap, have small warheads, and are easier to shoot down than a missile or aircraft, they cannot have much of a strategic effect. However, OWA drones are increasingly common in conflicts, from Ukraine to Sudan. As Ukraine’s attacks on Russia, Russia’s attacks on Ukraine, and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have shown, OWA drones can have an effect that goes far beyond the physical damage caused.
Slow-moving and lacking manoeuvrability, today’s OWA drones are, in theory, easy to shoot down. In reality, this is not so simple. OWA drones can now fly hundreds of miles, which means that defenders need to protect large areas of their airspace to intercept them. There is an additional concern that modern air defence systems designed for more sophisticated threats lack sufficient ‘magazine depth’ and may be overwhelmed trying to down hundreds of cheap but effective systems.
Pressing older air defence systems like the Gepard into service and deploying mobile air defence teams has proved to be a helpful but insufficient stopgap. Eschewing expensive air defence systems entirely is not always an option since waves of drones can be accompanied by missiles or other conventional threats. In any case, the interception rates don’t seem to be deterring users: Russia and Ukraine both routinely down OWA drones, but both are also producing and launching dozens each month.
Countering the OWA drones at sea
Militaries in the UK and other NATO countries are trying to figure out how to stop drones without breaking the bank. These could make the threat easier to manage but are often subject to the same constraints as traditional air defence systems. There is (usually) a tradeoff between range and cost. The systems that can shoot down a drone economically are good for defending a single facility or area, but it’s a problem when the attacker has drones with sufficient range to strike targets across a wide area.
The Royal Navy is in the middle of developing a high-energy laser system called ‘Dragonfire’ that reportedly costs 10GBP per use, but the only public figures about range are a test where the system was effective at an approximate range of two miles. Lasers could be very effective for point defence, but in situations such as the Red Sea, where Royal Navy vessels are defending commercial shipping, they may have to rely on traditional and expensive missiles like Sea Viper to down the OWA drones in time.
and on land…
On land, OWA drones will almost certainly proliferate to state and non-state actors. The ease with which a basic model can be constructed means that rebel groups, terrorists, and states without conventional long-range strike options can acquire them. Actors such as Iran have shown a willingness to proliferate them abroad. Iranian-aligned groups have used OWA drones to target US and coalition bases in the Middle East.
The bulk of Iran’s attack towards Israel consisted of OWA drones. Both attacks caused brief crises. In the same way that the UK and other nations had to adjust to improvised explosive devices and mortar attacks when deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, they will now need to account for adversaries having access to drones with substantial range. The British Army has recently test-fired Raython’s High Energy Laser Weapon System that could provide a short-range air cUAS defence for its fielded forces, particularly in an expeditionary context.
An opportunity for the UK?
OWA drones present a challenge to the UK, but they could also present an opportunity. Traditional standoff weapons are expensive to procure and maintain, and adversaries view them as escalatory. Many smaller NATO nations could seek their own fleets of OWA drones instead. In mid-February, the MoD announced that the UK and Latvia are sending drones to Ukraine, including OWA drones ‘to strike behind enemy lines’.
As the allies closer to Russia seek to rearm, the UK and others could sell or help develop OWA drones for NATO’s eastern members. An OWA drone fleet would be easier for them to store and maintain with their smaller defence budgets without the same level of alarm as acquiring other, more potent, standoff weapons. Some allies in the Pacific could also start building or acquiring OWA drones with the UK’s assistance. Much of the discourse about drones in the Pacific focuses on Taiwan, but other friendly nations like the Philippines are doubtlessly interested in taking advantage of the drone revolution to defend themselves.
Conclusion
As the UK and others reflect on what capabilities they will need in the future, policymakers need to recognise that the OWA drone threat is something that they will need to manage rather than solve. As drones and drone components become cheaper and more accessible, most militaries and armed groups will be able to produce and field them. Managing a threat like this is expensive. Even the cheapest cUAS system will need to be made in bulk and layered with more expensive defences to protect UK facilities, ships, and personnel. The UK has recently demonstrated its own Dragon Fire. cUAS will also need to keep pace with advancements in drone technology, such as autonomy. However, the only thing more costly than anticipating the threat of OWA drones is ignoring them until they appear on the horizon.
Marcel Plichta
Marcel Plichta is a PhD Candidate at the University of St Andrews and Instructor at the Grey Dynamics Intelligence School. He previously worked as an intelligence analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense. All views are his own