Want Europe to Defend Itself? Give It Something Specific to Do

Introduction

With NATO’s recent anniversary celebration behind it, the Alliance can look forward to another milestone at the end of next year.  December 2025 will mark 75 years since the creation of the position of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, or SACEUR.  The first man to hold the job – General Dwight D. Eisenhower – brought the prestige of his World War II service to the position, as well as his trademark pragmatism.  Eisenhower helped establish NATO’s military structures and outlined how the alliance would defend itself in practice.  Those past plans may provide important guideposts for NATO as it looks ahead.  

NATO’s geography and European responsibility

Eisenhower divided NATO-Europe into three geographic areas:  Allied Forces Central Region, which focused on the main body of the European continent; Allied Forces Southern Region, which covered Italy and, later, Greece and Turkey; and Allied Forces Northern Region, which focused on Scandinavia and surrounding waters. 

That last region, also known as AFNORTH, was unique in that its command structure prominently featured European general officers instead of a US lead, as in the others.  AFNORTH was headed by a British three-star general, with subordinate positions held by Danish, Norwegian, and eventually West German general and flag officers.  Only the air component was headed by a US general.

How is this relevant today? If the NATO Alliance is to remain viable, Europe must assume greater responsibility for its own defense within alliance structures.  This is, first and foremost, a political imperative.  The more Europe can do for itself, the more palatable continued US participation in NATO becomes. 

But greater European contributions are also a military necessity.  Ukraine and the Israeli-Hamas war have exposed weaknesses in US munitions reserves and industrial base capacity, presaging the limited availability of US conventional forces if war came in two theaters at once.  The US requirement to deter a war in the Pacific or – in the worst-case – fight one impacts the availability of its forces elsewhere.  NATO needs to acknowledge a future in which the US is unable to commit the bulk of its military power to a European contingency. 

The primacy of territorial defense

This brings us back to Eisenhower’s original plan, which was centered on territorial defense.  He made no allowances for out-of-area operations, only the protection of the alliance’s European members.  Getting NATO squarely back to a similar focus on the defense of the continent—after three decades of operations outside its border—is an essential first step.

This would mean re-establishing a formal geographic command structure rooted in territorial defense and rescinding the joint task force headquarters established at the 2003 Prague Summit in the wake of the September 11th attacks.  Doing so would leave no doubt about where NATO’s European members should exert their primary effort.  Europe’s military forces are most effectively deployed in their own theater; the more Europe can do for itself at home, the better it supports the US position in the Pacific and elsewhere. 

AFNORTH – a European lead?

A second lesson lies in the example of AFNORTH.  An aphorism often ascribed to Eisenhower is that plans are worthless but planning is everything.  NATO has no shortage of plans or planning bodies.  But most proceed from an increasingly false premise: that the United States will be the primary lead in any defensive operation.  This allows NATO’s European members to be judged by dubious metrics, such as the percentage of GDP committed to defense spending.  These simply show whether or not money is being spent but not to what end.

A revived AFNORTH would again encompass Scandinavia – to include NATO’s new frontline state, Finland – in addition to the Baltic states and adjacent sea zones.  Direct responsibility for such a Nordic-Baltic command would focus European minds on specific military tasks needed to protect that region, providing a concrete basis for planning – and spending.  It would also shift the conversation in NATO from what Europe can do to support the United States in protecting alliance territory to how the US can backstop a European-led defense of its most vulnerable region.

It’s not a binary choice

To be clear, this proposal is not a euphemism for abandonment.  Too often, debates over European security devolve into a binary choice between a dominant US lead on the one hand and a summary US withdrawal from NATO on the other.  There needs to be a practical middle ground that acknowledges the changing political and military realities of the US position without resorting to extremes. 

There should also be no delusions that Europe is equipped to immediately assume complete responsibility for defending the Nordic-Baltic area.  But it is hard to imagine getting to a place where Europe can do so without creating command structures that assign European members specific responsibilities against which to size their force structures and build their budgets.  Otherwise, European defense planning is likely to remain unfocused and, ultimately, dependent on US capabilities. 

Conclusion

For the immediate future, SACEUR should remain an American (as it has been from Eisenhower forward) while Europe develops the combat capability to justify holding that position.   A European-led subcommand in the Nordic-Baltic region creates a pathway for Europe to begin generating those forces while acknowledging US capabilities remain critical to Europe’s defense in the short term.  A revitalized AFNORTH would essentially serve as proof of concept for a European-led NATO Allioance at some future point. 

Europe assuming greater responsibility for its own defense within alliance structures should be a deliberate process, not a crash course.  But it must begin somewhere – and start now.