Lt Cdr Hooper Prize – First Place

First Prize Winner

ET(ME) Joseph Hardiman, Disposal and Reserve Ships Organisation

It is more than 40 years since the Falklands conflict. Evaluate the challenges the Royal Navy face if it was to engage in a non-UN/NATO supported conflict in the Southern hemisphere.

The Challenge

The Royal Navy faces significant challenges in engaging in a conflict in the Southern Hemisphere without UN/NATO interoperability and support. To ascertain the scope and gravity that underscores these challenges, this essay will focus upon identifying potential adversaries and the specific threats they pose to Britain. This analysis will not only highlight the viability of any hypothetical engagement but also underscore the critical nature of these threats. Secondly, addressing the lack of support is crucial. Although the possibility of forming sub alliances, as successfully done in past engagements, exists, and is explored through this essay, ultimately this scenario must be approached from a worst-case perspective. This methodology allows the Royal Navy to discern between its interoperability with NATO and its veritable shortcomings in both platform capability and lethality. Today, whilst the Royal Navy is exceptionally capable in certain areas it is too small to engage in conflicts at the scale it once could, and it cannot single-handedly meet the diverse threats emerging in an increasingly contested Southern Hemisphere.

Non-traditional adversaries

While it’s important to note that the Royal Navy’s primary adversaries lie in the Northern Hemisphere, namely Iran, China, and Russia, through careful analysis, it has become abundantly clear that the Southern Hemisphere presents a distinct set of challenges that the Royal Navy must rigorously evaluate to sustain its efficacy and lethality as a formidable fighting force. These encompass overseas British territories, inhabited by British subjects entitled to protection, as well as emerging threats from an increasingly contested region of the world. Firstly, the Falklands is still a significant point of contention for both Britain and Argentina. In 2013, a British-sanctioned referendum was conducted, which saw 99.8% of islanders voting to remain under British control. However, a poll conducted in the same year by YouGov, ascertained that only 15% of Argentinians shared the conviction of the British government, that the Islanders had a right to self-determination. This sentiment was tacitly reflected by the incumbent president Javier Milei, who in 2024 stated a desire to establish a clear “roadmap” to patriate the Falkland Islands into “Argentine hands.” Although he emphasized that any pursuit would be through “diplomatic channels” the situation still presents tangible concern for Britain. Milei is a populist, whose mandate survives on catering to the wants and desires of the ordinary citizen. In a country that firmly believes the Falklands belong to them as evidenced further by their celebration of Las Malvinas day annually (Argentine name for the islands), the failure of diplomatic channels could lead Milei, much like Galtieri in 1982, to leverage an invasion of the Falklands to stoke Argentine nationalism.

Global Threats

While the Falkland Islands present the most tactile point of contention, it is important to underscore the issue of new emerging threats. These are evidenced by adversaries from the Northern Hemisphere intensifying their presence within the region both directly and indirectly, presenting political and economic threats to both the Royal Navy and Britain. Firstly, The Maritime Security Threat Advisory (MTSA) reported in 2024 that an Iranian vessel had entered the Southern Hemisphere, citing this as “the first” instance of this happening. This exemplifies a navy, once decimated by the United States in 1988, now exhibiting defiance and a growing confidence. It is increasingly willing to extend its influence into new regions, thereby presenting a burgeoning threat. To compound this further, expanding Chinese influence within Southern Africa cited by geopolitical expert Dr. Innocent Batsani-Ncube, as “efforts to invert-democracy-enabling institutions” to create “China-friendly policy” represent a myriad of challenges. Given the strategic importance of Southern African waters as an alternative route to Asia, and the region being home too many of our Commonwealth allies, such as South Africa, it is cause for concern. A cold war-like domino effect could potentially lead to the emergence of new adversaries from previously friendly or allied nations. To mitigate these threats, it is imperative for the Royal Navy to bolster its presence in the region. This would not only demonstrate hard power, as effectively showcased by CSG 21 in the South China Sea, but could also serve as a deterrent around the Falkland Islands and, more specifically, in Southern Africa. Thus, maintaining robust relations which are critical to securing Britain’s economic interests and political alliances within the region.

Allies in an International context

Having identified potential adversaries, and ascertained the political, economic and social importance of doing so, it is imperative to devote greater scrutiny to the implication of ‘non-UN/NATO support’ and what this fundamentally means for the Royal Navy if it were to engage in a conflict within the Southern Hemisphere. Firstly, Britain’s involvement in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was condemned as “illegal” by a senior UN chief; further to this, on their official website NATO stated that they had ‘no role in the decision to undertake the campaign or to conduct it.’ However, the campaign saw the combined effort of many nations such as America; and Germany; which as a consequence improves the scope for potential support independent of the UN or NATO if any hypothetical conflict were to take place. This further epitomizes the existence of sub alliances within that extend beyond the purview of NATO, such as AUKUS, set up to create a nuclear submarine programme for Australia, through US and UK cooperation. Close ties with these nations could help mitigate any pressure in a conflict not supported by the UN or NATO. However, this would also depend on the nature of the conflict and whether it aligns with the interests of Britain’s allies. In 1982, the UN condemned Argentina for its invasion of the Falklands. However, the United States could not actively support Britain due to its conflicting allegiances to both nations. It is unlikely that Britain would be able to rely on sub-alliances for a second Falklands conflict; despite this, considerable scope regarding the potential threat of indirect influence from China and Iran within Southern Africa fundamentally exists and is an avenue the Royal Navy and Britain should explore.

Going alone: Would this be achievable if forced upon the UK?

Nevertheless, a conflict without UN support could have significant ramifications both politically and economically, and as such a degree of caution must be exercised. For example, during the Suez Crisis of 1956, the UN threatened Britain with sanctions. These threats alone caused the devaluation of the pound and had adverse effects on the economy. Historian J.C. Peden wrote that, “The Suez crisis is widely believed to have contributed significantly to Britain’s decline as a world power.” This epitomizes the necessity for clarity in the event of such a conflict and to acknowledge the considerable power wielded by organizations such as the UN and their ability to do considerable damage to Britain. Notwithstanding, Britain’s and the Royal Navy’s positive contributions to humanitarian aid during events like Hurricane Irma and the Ebola Crisis, as well as our extensive global ties that extend beyond NATO, including AUKUS and the Five Eyes, giving significant scope in international influence to mitigate potential fallout, it is still imperative to take the above into account to prevent precipitous action.

While it is important to discuss the scope for potential allied support and consider the possibility of a political fallout, it is integral to ascertain the Royal Navy’s capability to operate as an independent force to meet these identified threats. Ensuring so is not only a duty to its people, but it guarantees that, in the worst possible scenario, lethality is maintained. The last conflict in which the Royal Navy engaged in the Southern Hemisphere without allied platform interoperability was the Falklands conflict. During that time, the Royal Navy deployed eight destroyers and sixteen frigates. Today, with only six destroyers and nine frigates, despite having two aircraft carriers, there is a clear lack of capacity to launch a similar-sized task force. Deploying the entire fleet would create security threats in other areas, such as the Northern Atlantic and the UK. While the scale of such a conflict is conjectural, and the Royal Navy has been successful in deploying large task forces such as CSG 21, this was NATO supported and much smaller in scale, it is again imperative to prepare for the worst eventualities. These concerns in platform capability were identified by The Defence Committee as a lack of ‘anti-submarine’ deterrence and ‘frigates’ for multipurpose functions, noted in the 2021 white paper ‘We’re Going to Need a Bigger Navy.’ This sentiment was echoed by the Council on Geostrategy in 2024, emphasizing the need for greater mass, survivability, and integration to enhance the Royal Navy’s lethality.

Capability development: gaps, delays and plenty of ‘unknowns’

Whilst the Royal Navy has taken steps to resolve these platform shortages through the upcoming Type 26 and Type 31 designs, the majority of these will not see service until the 2030s, leaving them vulnerable in the interim. The council also cited issues regarding the Royal Navy’s submarine fleet, stating that Britain needs more ‘Nuclear Attack Submarines (SSNs)’ for ‘stealth anti-surface warfare purposes.’ Historically, submarines gave the Royal Navy the upper hand during the Falklands conflict, leading to the sinking of the General Belgrano by HMS Conqueror. The enemy’s inability to detect them can create panic, and in this case, resulted in the retreat of the entire Argentine Navy. Whilst the MOD has cited in their Defence Command Paper 2023 that a move toward ‘technology-centric’ capabilities is preferable, as exemplified by the multipurpose F35 jet, and increased automation and reliance on AI, and that simply today a lot more can be done with less, it is clear, given the conflict in Ukraine, that the proliferation of platform capability along with stockpiling munitions is integral, especially within the Southern Hemisphere, where potential adversaries are less clear and any conflict thus less predictable. To ignore this would be a fatal mistake; The Royal Navy needs to increase the size of both its surface and underwater fleet to not only project hard power but to meet any potential conflict with guaranteed lethality.

This concern ties into a broader societal issue in the UK: deindustrialisation, which has adversely affected procurement and costs. In 2022, former Minister of State for the MOD, Jeremy Quinn, emphasized that building Royal Naval vessels within the UK is “critical” to “national security” and of “economic” importance in supporting British industry, which once held a “60%” market share. Conversely, D.P. Connor of the University of Glasgow noted in 2009 that the closure of many shipyards has “reduced competitiveness and inflated costs.” This issue has permeated into the defence sector, evident in the £1 billion per platform cost of the Type 45 Programme and delays in the Queen Elizabeth class carrier production. Even the MOD, as evidenced through their decision to build the new RFA Tide-class ships in South Korea tacitly acknowledges these issues. Since foreign procurement poses political and economic issues, increasing defence expenditure from 2% to over 5% of GDP, as it was in 1982, is essential as it will help to accelerate production and platform mass. Alternatively, huge long-term investment in British shipbuilding is another option but not an immediate solution.

Conclusion

It is evident that the Royal Navy faces significant hurdles in overcoming issues regarding platform capability, procurement, and its proliferation. These issues would adversely affect its ability to launch a sizable task force within the region of the Southern Hemisphere without leaving itself vulnerable elsewhere. Whilst the interoperability of NATO and the support of the UN are invaluable assets, in scenarios where this cannot be achieved, the Royal Navy is left with diminished capability and lethality. Therefore, an ultimatum must be sought to mitigate these disadvantages. Whilst the Royal Navy should acknowledge the benefits of new emerging technologies, these must not be a substitute for platform mass. To precipitate this, greater funding against GDP is essential. As Britain moves into an increasingly unpredictable world, it is crucial that the Royal Navy can comfortably meet threats on all fronts in both hemispheres. By enacting these improvements, the Royal Navy will not only be a more independent fighting force with increased lethality, but one that acts as an even greater deterrence against both established and new emerging threats within the Southern Hemisphere.