Saving the Royal Air Force

This week, the Royal Air Force met in conference with the world’s Chiefs of the Air Staff, as it does every year, to discuss the future of Airpower in protecting the UK. The focus was deterrence, and the Chief of the Air Staff (Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton) was clear-eyed in showing, using data, how costly deterrence is, but how much less costly than war. Ending his speech rousingly with the line, “What we say matters. What we do matters even more.” “We” must be more than just the Royal Air Force. Protecting the nation requires pressure on those institutions tasked with developing the future of power. “We” means all of us.  

How history repeats itself.

In the pre-war generation of the 1930s, Lady Fanny Lucy Houston and others like her saved the Spitfire, the Royal Air Force, and perhaps the nation. By the beginning of the 1930s, it was clear that the Government and the Armed Forces were failing to prepare us for the coming war. But Lady Houston and other private citizens – galvanised others via media campaigns – stepped in with financial contributions, contests, and clubs to offset Government inertia in developing fighter aircraft. Today, that same inertia retards our development and adoption of uncrewed and robotic systems. If this is our 1930s moment, and Government and Armed Forces conservatism are once again the barrier to preparedness, perhaps private contributions, media campaigns, contests and clubs might be the best route to save us today too. 

By 1933 the Royal Air Force had just 13 squadrons of fighters and 12 of bombers stationed in the UK. The largest air force in the world in 1918, it now ranked only fifth. The pre-war generation were a long way from ready. 

As for aeroplanes, then, so for drones today. Over the next 10 years, the UK plans to spend £4.6  billion on drones, or £460 million a year, against a MOD budget expected to rise to £87 billion a year by 2030. Put another way, the plan is that 0.5% of the defence budget will be spent on drones by 2030. If this does not change, and we have to go to war, we will lose. If our enemies know we will lose, they are more likely to attack us. We are not ready, and the plans must change. What can we learn from the past? 

Lady Houston’s direct financial contributions allowed RJ Mitchell to accelerate the development of the Supermarine aircraft that became his Supermarine Spitfire – in 1931, her £100,000 donation, £5.7 million today – allowed Mitchell to enter and win one of the preeminent air power contests of the day – the Schneider Trophy, a time-trial speed race. The competition took place in the teeth of opposition from the Prime Minister, Chancellor, Cabinet, Air Ministry and Royal Air Force.  

Did it make a difference? The Supermarine S6 aircraft developed for the race was part of the lineage that led to the Supermarine Spitfire. As the then managing director of Rolls Royce, said:  

“It is not too much to say that research for the Schneider Trophy contest over the past two years is what our aero-engine department would otherwise have taken six to ten years to learn.”

Nijboer, D., 2014. Spitfire V Vs C. 202 Folgore: Malta 1942 (Vol. 60). Bloomsbury Publishing.

We need the private, charitable and media funding of contests, to accelerate drone development, and build pressure on the conservative institutions of Government and the Armed Forces just as we once needed them to drive the adoption of piloted planes. 

Media campaigns were important too. From 1933, Lady Houston championed fighter aircraft through her controversial newspaper the Saturday Review. Her approach, usefully illustrative as it is, was not new. Throughout 1920s and 1930s the British press played a role in highlighting the need for investment in aircraft. The Daily Mail married campaigns to private contributions to fund contests, awarding £24,050 (£2.3M today) in prize money for aeronautical contests before the first world war. Lord Rothermere, owner of the Daily Mail, created the National League of Airmen in 1935, counting among its supporters the Duke of Westminster and Major-General Fuller to campaign for more investment for the Air Force from Government. Rothermere claimed to have spent £50,000 (£3M today) on his newspaper’s  ‘air campaign’ in the 1930s. 

We have recently seen the power of such media campaigns in the UK. The Times has almost single-handedly made the long-standing issue of sewage leaks into our rivers and seas a pressing electoral issue. An extended campaign could similarly galvanise the rapid modernisation of the Armed Forces through the adoption of drone technology at a pace commensurate with its rising utility. 

Beyond campaigns, contributions, and contests, clubs played a crucial role. 

In 1909, fearing the UK would not adopt aircraft as weapons of war fast enough, the Air League of the British Empire was setup “To disseminate knowledge and spread information showing the vital importance to the British Empire of air supremacy upon which its commerce, communications, defence and its very existence must largely depend”. The Air League would focus on patriotic and educational promotion of aviation, acting as the paramount body above two other clubs, the Aeronautical Society which would promote aviation science, and the Aero Club that would promote aviation through sport. 

Air-mindedness grew through these national clubs, and was accelerated following the First World War with the establishment of clubs across the country. Air Vice Marshal Sefton Brancker, serving as Director Civil Aviation in Government, encouraged the construction of regional airports, and setup Flying Clubs across Britain. The clubs were enabled by but outside of Government. Between 1925 and 1939 around 60 such clubs were formed, training over 5000 pilots.  

By 1933, the pressure from such campaigns began to tell, and Britain began to build an Air Force fit to defend it. In the years that followed, the Royal Air Force, still budgetarily constrained, built its own more formal clubs: a Tactical Air Force comprised of reservists, an Auxiliary Air Force, a Special Reserve, University Air Squadrons, an RAF Voluntary Reserve – all to promote the understanding of Air Power, and to grow the skills and strength that would be needed upon the Air Force’s rapid expansion as war approached. Today, no such groups focused on drones exist, at least not with any support from the Royal Air Force or Ministry of Defence. Again, this must change if we are to be fit to fight. 

By 20 May 1939, through the combined efforts, of campaigns, contests and clubs, Empire Air Day was celebrated with flying displays up and down the country. The Air Review, the Air League’s journal, celebrated their success announcing; ‘we have become an air minded nation’. 

These organisations, once revolutionary, have become the conservative establishment they once railed against. Built by pilots to promote their profession and sport, they are unlikely to switch to campaigning for uncrewed systems. Where is our national Air League, Aeronautical Society, and Aero Club for drones? Where are our flying clubs up and down the country for uncrewed systems? Where is our media campaign? 

We have focused on lessons from the Second World War. But it is worth noting that these lessons are timeless: campaigns, clubs and contests have long been used to overcome conservative resistance to new weapons of war, to prepare nations to defend themselves, and to deter war through strength. In the 3rd Century BC, having seen the power of catapults in war, the Ancient Greeks were holding catapult competitions through local Gymnasiums, and the winners were rewarded with prizes. When the English recognised the battle-winning value of the longbow in 1252, King Henry passed his ‘Assize of Arms’ – a law requiring all men aged 15-60 to train in the use of the longbow and equip themselves with bows and arrows. Every town and village would have ‘butts to practice’. In 1363, Edward III mandated  ‘…that every able bodied man on feast days when he has leisure shall in his sports use bows and arrows, pellets or bolts, and shall learn and practice the art of shooting.’ It was this strategic use of clubs and contests that laid the basis for Edward III’s 14th Century ‘revolution in military affairs’  and the famous English victories at Agincourt and Crecy. Drones today are yesterday’s fighter aircraft, catapults, longbows: essential, but resisted. 

This pre-war generation will need media-led drone campaigns, charity in the form of private donations for prizes for drone development and deployment, drone clubs and drone contests to prepare adequately. It is hardly a secret that it was a close run thing last time around. The preparation is too important to be left to the current air power establishment alone.