The United Kingdom and European security at a time of uncertainty

The UK has initiated yet another review of defence and security.  The newly-elected Labour Party has stated an intent to seek a United Kingdom – European Union security pact whilst maintaining commitments to NATO and the Joint Expeditionary Force.  This is despite the prevailing uncertainty as to the commitment of allies, both within Europe and beyond, to existing defence treaties.  Given Labour’s commitment to a new strategic defence review it is unclear what the requirement for a United Kingdom – European Union security pact is based on.  Whatever multilateral frameworks the new government chooses to develop new treaties and pacts with it must ensure that these add value, not create duplication, expense and confusion in pursuit of a political soundbite.

The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) lists its first priority as protecting ‘the UK, its Crown Dependencies, and its Overseas Territories’.  In considering European security, the inclusion of Dependents and Territories shows that security on the European continent and the security responsibilities of states within the European Continent are not the same thing.

NATO and the European Union

Both NATO and the European Union are multilateral organisations with decisions based on consensus amongst member states. NATO has 32 member states spread over Europe and North America, while the European Union has 27 Members, all in Europe.  There is considerable overlap between the two organisations.

 

Donald Trump’s comments about defence spending by NATO members, alongside an increased focus by the United States on the Indo-Pacific, has driven a lot of the discussion concerning European defence.  As it was probably intended to. Whilst such statements do not necessarily reflect policy, even if Trump is re-elected, they have highlighted long standing issues of European defence preparedness.  NATO’s latest spending figures show that eight NATO members are expected to fail to meet the NATO threshold of spending 2% of GDP on Defence in 2024.  Of these seven are European with the other being Canada. All seven European states are also members of the EU.

NATO and EU defence spending

Considering the European Union as an alternative to NATO for the provision of European security, in the absence of the US, whether this is due to lack of political commitment or simply due to military commitment elsewhere, is a legitimate exercise.  But such an exercise needs to consider the actual makeup of both organisations.  According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the four members of the EU not in NATO all fail to spend 2% of GDP on defence.  The closest is Cyprus at 1.8%, and the lowest is Ireland at 0.2%. By contrast all the European members of NATO not in the EU meet the 2% spending threshold.

By looking at the EU as a potential partner organisation for defence the United Kingdom would gain an alliance with four additional countries over those covered by NATO with a combined defence expenditure of $6.358 billion (in 2023).  Norway alone, as a European country outside of the EU but within NATO had a defence expenditure of $8.668 billion in 2023 according to SIPRI figures. Turkiye, another European power in NATO but not in the EU spent over $15.8 billion in 2023 and has the second largest military in NATO, after the United States.

In short, even without United States involvement, NATO provides greater nuclear and conventional military defence capabilities in Europe than the European Union.  Maintaining structures to support both risks duplication, wasting resources, and potentially adding confusion given the significant overlap in membership.  The four members of the EU not in NATO would add defence liabilities whilst bringing little in the way of additional defence assets or capabilities. Austria and Ireland both declare themselves to be militarily neutral.

The North Atlantic Treaty

NATO’s founding document consists of 14 Articles, is short for an international treaty and is more explicit than many defence treaties.  The commonly referenced attack on one is an attack on all element of Article 5 is the most widely known.  Less well known is that Article 5 goes on to say ‘if such an armed attack occurs, each of them… will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force’.  It is quite possible that a NATO ally could consider the donation of helmets as an action it deems necessary to meet its obligations.

This does not mean that alternative United Kingdom and European security and defence agreements would provide better mechanisms. In reality, the responses of NATO members are planned, exercised and considered. and the Treaty does require some form of action.  Many defence treaties simply provide for having a conversation.  In 1994, Ukraine received a commitment from the UK and the US simply to raise any attack against Ukraine in the UN in return for relinquishing its nuclear weapons.  No country will commit itself to fighting in a legal treaty for fear of being dragged into conflict by the actions of a future government of a current ally against its own interests.

Articles Three and Six

Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty requires members to be capable of self-help and develop their individual capacity to resist armed attack.  This is where European states within NATO have failed in their responsibilities, making NATO dependent on the United States as a single source of some military capabilities.  As far as defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP provides some means of measuring the countries which have done the least in this area, all the European powers that have failed to meet the 2% spending commitment are also in the EU, with most of the non-NATO EU states being even worse.

The Tropic of Cancer

Another overlooked Article of the North Atlantic Treaty is Article 6 which limits the scope of Article 5 (an attack on one is an attack on all) to attacks in Europe, North America or the North Atlantic Area north of the Tropic of Cancer (shown as a red dashed line in the images below).

 

The United Kingdom has 14 overseas territories for which it has defence and security responsibilities.  Some of these are north of the Tropic of Capricorn, but many are not and, therefore, are not covered by NATO’s mutual defence provisions.  The European Union has 13 overseas countries and territories via its members Denmark, France, and the Netherlands.  This does not include French Guiana, which is considered a region of France but is located south of the Tropic of Cancer.

Overseas territories are therefore an area of potential defence cooperation between the United Kingdom and the European Union.  Such a bilateral approach would however exclude Norway, a NATO ally not in the European Union.  Norway has overseas territories in the Arctic and Antarctic regions, with its claimed territory in the Antarctic bordering the United Kingdom’s.  Such an approach would also be complicated by US military bases on the United Kingdom’s Ascension Island and British Indian Ocean Territory.

Consensus decision making

NATO’s main decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council which oversees political and military decision-making which affects the organisation.  Each member state is represented on the Council and decision making is by consensus i.e. everyone has to agree.  This approach allows a single member to be a barrier to action.  The European Union is also largely dependent on consensus decision making at the political level meaning that it is not a natural alternative to deadlock in NATO.  This has most recently been demonstrated by Hungary’s position on support to Ukraine.  As a member of both NATO and the European Union, Hungary can block or delay decision making on any defence and foreign policy position.

Consensus does not however require active support. Germany opposed NATO’s actions in Libya in 2011 but did not block the use of NATO frameworks and actions.  It simply refused to take part.  NATO established a ‘framework nations’ concept at its 2014 summit, which provided for ‘military formations within NATO, between like-minded partners that could co-operate together on military capabilities and military operations’.  This provided a basis for a more flexible and responsive approach to regional security issues without the need for full NATO consensus or participation.  It is under this framework that the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) consisting of 10 northern European nations with the UK as a framework nation was established.

European security

Europe’s high north covers the region of the Arctic.  There are eight Arctic powers of which seven are now in NATO with the other being Russia, an identified threat to European security.  Only Denmark, Sweden and Finland are in the EU and these are also in NATO and the JEF.  With Norway also being a JEF member, if the North American states of the United States and Canada were unavailable to contribute to security in the high north UK interests would be better served through the JEF than in a bilateral agreement with the European Union. 

The Greenland-Iceland United Kingdom gap is a key element in securing Euro-Atlantic supply lines.  In addition to the named countries, Norway is also important to the security of this region.  All are in NATO, and all are in the JEF, but only Greenland (via Denmark) is part of the EU.  In Eastern Europe, the NATO and European Union borders with Russia are the same (the only difference between NATO and the European Union’s land border with Russia is Norway’s border of just under 200 kilometres inside the Arctic Circle).

Hybrid threats

Nuclear and conventional military forces are not the only factors in considering national defence and security.  The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats was established in Finland before that country’s accession to NATO and supports both NATO and the European Union.  NATO has various lines of activity concerning hybrid threats but states that the primary responsibility for responding to hybrid threats or attacks rests with the targeted country.  The European Union has a number of what it terms joint competencies where it shares responsibility alongside individual member states.  Some of these are relevant to countering hybrid threats and may therefore be of relevance for a potential security agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union.  These include police cooperation, judicial cooperation, terrorism, money laundering, corruption, computer crime, organised crime, and energy.

Conclusion

NATO remains the bedrock of United Kingdom and European security, this was publicly demonstrated in the aftermath of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine when European Union members Finland and Sweden rushed to join NATO.  The invasion did not prompt any NATO members to join the European Union.

Irrespective of changing personalities within the US administration, European members need to develop capabilities to be able to operate without support from the United States.  This is necessary to provide time for the United States to build up forces to respond to an issue in Europe or because the United States is militarily committed elsewhere.  The European Union offers no advantages to doing this outside of NATO because the major European Union defence actors are also members of NATO.  Changing the branding under which a country provides military capability does not change that country’s military capability.  Pursuing a defence agreement with the European Union concerning nuclear or conventional military capabilities risks duplication and a reduction of international cohesion.

Where NATO processes prove to be too cumbersome or blocked smaller coalitions of the willing operating under a ‘framework nation’ structure provide a good alternative.  The European Union does provide potential for cooperation on overseas territories but the greatest value of a potential security agreement probably lies in countering hybrid threats in Europe.  Even here any potential agreement with the European Union would need to be compatible with other bilateral arrangements.  On energy security for example the UK’s primary supplier of energy imports is Norway (NATO and JEF, not European Union) with the largest share of oil imports coming from the United States (NATO, not JEF or European Union).

Any new United Kingdom and European security and defence treaties should ensure constructive augmentation, not destructive duplication.

(main image courtesy of NATO)