Introduction
On 25 August, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) carried out a series of airstrikes in southern Lebanon, claiming that Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed militant group in Lebanon, had been preparing to fire a large number of rockets and missiles into Israeli territory. IDF spokesman Daniel Hagari said the Israeli military had acted in self-defence to eliminate imminent threats from Hezbollah-linked targets.
Shortly after the Israeli strikes, Hezbollah launched an offensive of its own against Israel in reaction to the killing of Fouad Shukur, one of the group’s top commanders, in an attack on Beirut’s southern suburbs in July. Despite the fact that neither Israel nor Hezbollah seems willing to wage a full-blown armed conflict, the spectre of an Israel-Hezbollah war becomes ever more profound.
It seems fitting to say that de-escalation remains challenging in this volatile environment of deep-rooted enmities and competing geopolitical interests. Furthermore, with conflicting interests, particularly evident in the Gaza war, the protracted low-intensity conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has become increasingly intense and violent over the past few months.
Each tit-for-tat exchange and retaliatory strike brings the existing conflict closer to the brink of a full-scale war. Even if all parties involved do not seek such a war, history reveals that it can still happen. This raises a critical question: Can Israel defeat Hezbollah? To explore this, we should take a closer look at Israel’s last major military operation against Hezbollah, the Second Lebanon War.
The Second Lebanon War – 2006
On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah fighters initiated multiple attacks on various targets along Israel’s northern border. In reaction to these cross-border raids, the then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert ordered a strong military retaliation. Accordingly, the IDF launched an offensive against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon. The armed conflict lasted until 14 August 2006, when, after 34 days of fighting, a United Nations-brokered ceasefire took effect. While both sides claimed victory, many military experts argue that Israel failed to achieve its strategic objectives and narrowly avoided a tactical defeat.
With both sides claiming victory, it was Hezbollah’s performance against Israel, despite the obvious military asymmetry, that attracted the most attention. Several military thinkers discussed the key factors behind Hezbollah’s surprising success against one of the world’s most highly trained and well-equipped armed forces. In this kind of environment, Frank Hoffman’s concept of hybrid warfare, in which he argues that Hezbollah neutralised much of a Western-style military’s superior warfighting capabilities by merging advanced conventional weapons with irregular tactics, garnered considerable interest in military debates.
Hezbollah’s Hybrid War
According to Hoffman, ‘Hezbollah’s use of C802 anti-ship cruise missiles and a volley of rockets represents a sample of what ‘Hybrid Warfare’ might look like’. Moreover, he has emphasized the significance of the strategic battle of perceptions when evaluating Hezbollah’s relative success against Israel. In this regard, Hoffman has maintained that Hezbollah’s advanced propaganda activities were as important as its military performance during the Second Lebanon War. Hoffman has argued that although Hezbollah’s victory over Israel appears controversial in purely military terms, the militant group came out of the 34-day War in a stronger position thanks to its effective information operations.
Hezbollah in 2024
Hezbollah is now a considerably stronger than it was in 2006 and is generally regarded as the most powerful violent non-state actor in the world. A report released by the Atlantic Council says that since the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah has, with backing from Iran, significantly expanded in terms of size, capabilities, structure, and military experience. Hezbollah is currently estimated to have around 30,000 active fighters and a reserve force of 10,000 to 20,000 additional combatants. Israel assesses that Hezbollah now possesses between 130,000 and 150,000 surface-to-surface rockets and missiles, a tenfold increase compared to its 2006 inventory.
In addition to being the most heavily armed non-state actor in the world, Hezbollah now possesses more advanced propaganda capabilities. During the 34-day War in 2006, it primarily relied on TV, satellite, and radio, but Hezbollah now also uses the internet and various digital media platforms to conduct its information operations.
Hezbollah and Lebanon
Furthermore, it would not be an exaggeration to assert that Hezbollah functions not simply as an armed non-state group but as a ‘state within a state’. Hezbollah exerts substantial political influence in Shia-majority regions of Lebanon, fully engages in Lebanon’s democratic institutions, and operates a welfare system that surpasses the effectiveness of the Lebanese state’s own welfare system. As a non-state actor, Hezbollah has grown into the most influential political force in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s dominance in Lebanon extends beyond its role as a political-military organisation; it exerts considerable influence over the Lebanese government, shaping key decisions and policies to a significant degree.
Conclusion
Israel faces challenges in any potential war with Hezbollah. The considerable growth in Hezbollah’s military capabilities and its propaganda activities indicate that a full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah could be both protracted and violent. Hezbollah’s powerful role within the Lebanese state could escalate any potential conflict with Israel into a broader confrontation. The current geopolitical landscape may further complicate the situation on the ground. Hezbollah’s allies, Iran, Syria and Houthi rebels, also see Israel as their enemy. The potential involvement of these protagonists in any fighting would worsen the war for Israel. While Israel may seek to weaken Hezbollah’s military capabilities, it will encounter greater strategic challenges that lie beyond the immediate battleground of the Israel-Lebanon border.
Main picture: Hezbollah drone operator during in an exercise in the Jezzine District, southern Lebanon, on Sunday, May 21, 2023. (Wikimedia Commons)
Tarik Solmaz
Tarik Solmaz holds a PhD in Strategy and Security from the University of Exeter. His PhD
thesis, 'Rethinking the Concept of Hybrid Warfare: A Revisionist Perspective' provides a
critical re-evaluation of hybrid warfare, examining both the concept and its practical
applications. From 2014 to 2018, he served as a security analyst in the Undersecretariat of
Public Order and Security (Turkey). Dr Solmaz has written on security issues for RealClear
Defense, Small Wars Journal, LSE Blog, Lowy Institute.