Will Traditions Hold us Back?

Tradition can be defined as an inherited, established and customary pattern of thought or action that can be transmitted from generation to generation due to their commonly accepted authority. In a military sense, Army traditions encompass customs and beliefs that unite different sets of soldiers. These traditions take form to us as behaviours, doctrine and actions.

The British Army’s website states that ‘The British Army is a professional and disciplined team, with a long tradition of service to the country‘.¹Readers can infer that this means the Army does the nation’s bidding, whether at war or peacetime, without delay or question. This endures (and has done since 1689) always; we know this from the long standing function of Parliament to authorise taxes for war and defence. It can be safely assumed then that the ‘tradition’ of the British Army being ever-present and ready to provide defence for the British people is a good one.

Does tradition hold us back?

But do Army traditions hold us back in other areas of defence? As the Army evolves and responds to current and emerging threats can it respond sufficiently? Valerii Zaluzhnyi wrote recently that technology ‘boasts an undoubted superiority over tradition’.²

Arguably he was cornered into this analysis through the rigours of a war he oversaw as the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army, until February 24. However, Zaluzhnyi’s dismissal does not make it a poor analysis; Zaluzhnyi’s Army went to war with Russia and faced some of the most extreme fighting in Europe since WW2. They have had to adapt and survive whilst holding off Russian military superiority and they learned quickly that holding on to tradition and current thinking was costly. Adapting to the threat and remaining fluid is one thing; changing your approach entirely is quite another, but quite necessary according to Zaluzhnyi.

When Zaluzhnyi mentioned ‘traditions’ (doctrine & processes), he was talking about improving the situation on the battlefield. He went so far as to state that a wholesale redesign of battlefield operations was needed to distance themselves from outdated, stereotypical thought processes that were harming his troops and country’s war effort through simply being not up to task. This redesign, he concluded, would reshape Ukrainian military doctrine on a fundamental level for the better and help Ukrainian soldiers compete with and defeat Russian troops. This would however require substantial buy-in to be successfully integrated. No small task but surely too risky to ignore; the war with Russia was handing out lessons in evolutionary warfare and Zaluzhnyi was paying attention.

Relevance of experience

The British Army has had no such recent exposure or conflict with a peer adversary. The COIN environment in Iraq and Afghanistan taught us valuable lessons in insurgency warfare, counter-IED, ISTAR and medical support which ‘had a profound impact on the Army’s equipment, training and doctrine’,³  but arguably did not find shortcomings in it. Consequently we have no experience of what should be retained and what should be dismissed or updated regarding our approach to warfare and warfighting. How are we to know if our doctrine will hold up in a large-scale peer to peer engagement? We have banked heavily on the Land Operating Concept (LOpC): 18 months in the making, full of NATO partner consultation input and interrogated by RUSI, ISS and DTsL; it is the doctrine that dictates how we will win future wars. General Sir Patrick Sanders said it is ‘the most robustly evidenced and inclusive piece of conceptual thinking that the Army has produced in over three decades. This places the British Army at the intellectual edge of land warfare, able to lead in NATO and support our sister services across all domains’. ⁴

The LOpC clearly shows then that as an organisation we are attuned to the need to evolve and adapt to the changing threats around the globe. It highlights the need for need for technological superiority and information domination. Conceptually and doctrinally then the Army is adapting and taking note of the ‘lessons in evolutionary warfare’. So far so good.

But do we need to go deeper with our ‘evolution’? Can we evolve and adapt without fundamental reform? The term thinking outside the box is a well-used phrase in the British Army. It asks to be creative and think outside of ‘Army traditions’. It has served us well, noting 22 SAS were essentially born from thinking outside the box. But nowadays all boxes are contained within larger ones. So is thinking outside of a box just thinking inside a bigger one? In his 2009 RUSI speech General Sir David Richards stated the UK needed a ‘fundamental re-think of the way we prepare and equip our armed forces for the twenty-first century’.⁵At that time the SDSR (15) was six years away from delivery and we were committed to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, two very dynamic and influential operational theatres. That notwithstanding, Gen Sir David Richards had highlighted a need for a ‘re-think’ and yet fifteen years later here we are re-thinking it all again. We are still inside the ‘bigger box’. Of course, things are different now to how they were in 2009 and the fact we are doing another re-think shows we are attempting to adapt. But as Patrick Hennessey states in his book, ‘The British Army has a fine tradition of being so distracted by what it is currently up to it stubbornly refuses to look round the corner, let alone into the future’, ⁶ is the continual rethink process evidence of an oversight at a deeper level?

Tactical traditions

If strategic rethinking of army traditions are taking place, then it stands to reason that the British Army should look at the tactical traditions; the ‘deeper level’, i.e. everything we do on a day-to-day basis. The default shouldn’t be to get rid of it, but to assess whether it has place in a modern cutting-edge Army. The British Secret Service Agent W. Somerset Maugham (Jan 1874 – Dec 1965) succinctly states: ‘tradition is a guide and not a jail’. ⁷ Maughan was trying to remind us that just because something is tradition, it shouldn’t be untouchable. Consequently, it is hard to imagine how to modernise and counter ever-changing threats as an organisation without bottom-up investigation of the ‘traditions’ themselves. Ultimately we want to increase our lethality. So what is worth retaining and what should be disposed of to make us more lethal?

is the regimental system more important than the regiments?

These ‘tactical traditions’ range from tea & toast in the Messes to the Infantry Battle School’s Fan Dance event. These are bookended by things like sports afternoons and the Regimental system. It is a wide and packed spectrum full of varied and wonderful things but, according to Maughan, they are not a jail to be imprisoned by. But nor are they to be dismissed without careful consideration. Take for example the regimental system; it would take an almost revolutionary act to dispose of it and adopt a more American style, but we have seen Regiments themselves disbanded over the last two decades (notably in the Infantry) without real opposition or resistance. It asks the question – is the regimental system more important than the regiments?

Historic reform

The British politician and Secretary of State for War Lord Edward Cardwell (July 1813 – February 1886) introduced the Cardwell Reforms, merging 110 infantry regiments into 69 2-battalion regiments (he also ended the purchasing of commissions for officers, a fine Army Tradition…). This trend of reform continued with the Hugh Childers (June 1827 – January 1896, also a Secretary of State for War) Reforms, removing regimental seniority numbers and more recently, the House of Commons Defence Committee’s White Paper; ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World’ (2004) which merged and created new regiments.

Arguably, Cardwell, Childers and the 2003 Defence Select Committee were proven correct; their reforms reacted to current threats, modernised the Army and ended some questionable practices (the lash, buying and selling of commissions for example). However this fact does not diminish that with each of their reforms, a lot of history and army tradition was swept into the annals of history with a stroke of pen; ‘many believe it has diluted the heritage and tradition of unique organisations’.⁸ It is safe to assume then that the members of those now defunct regiments did not take to kindly to their retirement and whether we agree with the disbandment/reforms or not, we must assume some sort of due process was administered to the procedures (the due process being an analysis, judgement and then action) and not a knee-jerk reaction. Consequently, if regiments are not safe from being wound up or merged, then surely the system that bound them to other regiments is not safe from upheaval or modification either. It can be surmised then that the requirement to remove or replace the regimental system is not safe from interrogation and subsequent modernisation/reformation in the same mindset of Cardwell and Childers.

Brecon chop

On any given day in Wales, if you were walking around the Brecon Beacons National Park you are quite likely to come across British Infantry soldiers working tirelessly to get up an incline or running down it. They are taking part in the infamous ‘Fan Dance’ event, a 24 km loaded march across some of South Wales’ highest peaks. They do this as part of the promotion courses that the Infantry Battle School run to train the next iteration of infantry Corporals, Sergeants and 2Lts. It is considered a rite of passage, a ‘army tradition’ that marks your confirmation as an NCO/officer in the Infantry. It is, without doubt, an event that is synonymous with the Battle School. Is it necessary though? Does it teach anything about being a Corporal, Sergeant or Officer in the Infantry? A powerful argument is that it is a great ‘leveller’; that is, it is completed by everyone across the rank range, uniting ranks and messes. If you ask an NCO or officer about ‘Jacob’s Ladder’ or the ‘stretcher’ they will be able to answer with experience. In this instance the quote ‘In a military sense, traditions encompass customs and beliefs that unite different sets of soldiers’⁹ is appropriate; the ‘Fan Dance’ is a custom that unites soldiers and officers in a shared experience, which in turn helps maintain relationships and promote the brother/sisterhood that is so important in warfighting (and the lead up to it);  ‘When you serve with your brothers and sisters in arms, you develop a bond that lasts a lifetime ‘.¹⁰ Consequently this demonstrates an argument to retain the Fan Dance as a ‘tradition’ within the Infantry; it has a clear and beneficial function and does not feel out of date or irrelevant. Perhaps in time, new events may supersede the Fan Dance and one day it may even be removed all-together; we are not ‘imprisoned’ by it but use it as a ‘guide’. Maugham would be satisfied with this conclusion.

Up until the late 1800s, corporal punishment was regularly used as a form of punishment for British soldiers. It was administered by soldiers under orders from officers and could range from ‘wearing new trousers outside the barrack gates while drunk’ to ‘making a disrespectful gesture to the adjutant’.¹¹ Vague and ambiguous at best, the use of the ‘lash’ was vicious and critics ‘deplored it as barbaric’.11 Common lashes numbered towards 500, and this was enough to kill a man. The Duke of Wellington, who famously labelled his men ‘scum of the earth’, was used as validation by officers to embolden their decisions to punish soldiers as they were seen as unruly reprobates and criminals, though Wellington himself had said in 1846: ‘… diminish the punishment as much as possible, and I hope I may live to see it abolished altogether’. ¹²

When Cardwell became Secretary of State, he almost immediately abolished the practice of flogging (among other punishments). A fan of efficiency, he understood that to improve retention and aid recruitment the ‘lash’ had to go. Officers raised their objections but they were overruled. Interestingly, flogging was only abolished in peacetime; it remained a punishment on active service until 1881.

Modern soldiering?

We can safely assess that no one wants to see a return of flogging, it is outdated and completely at odds with modern soldiering. Cardwell felt the same and pushed through his reforms to modernise the British Army and improve its attractiveness as an employer. At the time the abolishment was objected to by many officers who saw it as an erosion of discipline enforcement. One can wonder at the shaking of heads and strongly worded conversations about losing the ‘lash’. However, regardless of these objections and strong words, flogging was indeed abolished. Fast forward to today and we are still shaking our heads at changes in army traditions, losing regiments and erosion of our proudly earned history. Whilst this is all understandable, will we be looked upon in 150 years as out of date when we resisted changes we didn’t agree with? Undeniably impossible to predict, but we should be wary of imprisoning ourselves to things that should be just a ‘guide’.

If we are not wary of investigating deep-rooted ‘tactical traditions’ with the Army, then it stands to reason that we would apply the same integrity to the ‘strategic’ ones. This would, of course, require assessment and evidence, but it would root out and expose those who are fit and unfit for purpose. In a recent conversation with a WO2, I discussed the application on Platoon tactics in modern battle. I asked is the ‘traditional’ format of platoons and sections applicable when the environment and enemy should dictate how to fight – as in can a commander have the freedom to break down his forces as he sees fit and align them to a task in an AO, with orders along the lines of ‘here’s your area of operations – spend the next week causing havoc on the enemy’? Reductive example yes – but the point is to question whether applying a platoon to a task that can be completed by a few well-equipped soldiers is worthwhile or tactically sensible when other options exist (if we allow); can we capstone every engagement with the enemy with the Infantry Platoon Tactics Pam (advance to contact in extended line anyone)? It is also worth taking into consideration how the medical chain, so finely tuned and perfected on Herrick and Telic, would hold up in a modern engagement with a peer or near-peer adversary. What happens to the ‘golden hour’? In a ‘war’, the mission is the priority, and ‘winning the firefight’ may be a weeklong contact in a rubblised town against a well trained and equipped force and not a lone soldier in an open weapons pit in a woodblock.

Zaluzhnyi realised that his Army had to evolve to meet and contest the Russian forces. His numerous essays labour the point for adapting to the threat and not being tied to ‘tradition’. It may have cost him his job but it would be folly to dismiss his findings with his experiences in land warfare. Interestingly, it’s worth noting that the technology he insists beats tradition is currently bogging down both the Russians and the Ukrainians, ‘… it’s difficult to move to and from trenches or reinforced dugouts’. ¹³ Drones have completely denied freedom of movement and forces are reluctant to patrol without them. They have become ‘imprisoned’ by them and have arguably ended up back at square 1; the war in Ukraine has become one of ‘position’ and is ‘moving to a new stage: “positional” warfare with static and attritional fighting’. ¹⁴

Modern validation

It is exposing tactics and actions that we should be taking note of. With this ascension of drones and the inevitable ‘creep’ of their use in any future conflict, and to avoid this happening to the British Army, should we be assessing how to combat the drone threat and incorporate them into our doctrine to avoid any ‘positional’ stalemates? Should we be on exercise revisiting cam and concealment doctrine and improving our C-ISR skills?

Exercise Wessex Storm is a routine validation exercise for Infantry units. Spread out over the Salisbury Plain Training estate, it combines arms and units and tests them on their tactics and SOPs under the overarching banner of ‘validation’; ‘The aim of Exercise Wessex Storm is to provide troops with realistic, varied training focused on fighting in built-up areas and preparing for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear warfare, as well as fighting in woods and forests. There are also opportunities to practice casualty evacuation without helicopter support’. ¹⁵

Units deployed on Wessex Storm must meet and pass certain criteria to get the ‘validation’ tick. The contesting forces are provided by British soldiers who wear a blue disrupted pattern uniform to differentiate between exercising troops and the opposing force. Yet almost every peer/near-peer force that we may face on the battlefield use effective camouflage patterns. So why are the opposing force on Wessex Storm wearing blue – if the exercise is to provide the most realistic training possible why are they not wearing more realistic uniform? Arguably this is an example of Zaluzhnyi’s ire with traditional and current thinking. Keeping things the same for the sake of it serves no one.

Conclusion

As an organisation we should not be bowed to things just because they ‘are’. We should be relentless in our pursuit of best practice and not shy away from changing things if they no longer serve the Army a purpose. The British Army is a fine organisation full of magnificent soldiers and officers who sacrifice a great deal to serve the nation. The Army must match that commitment by asking if any ‘army traditions’ are holding us back and if they are, canvass for solutions and consequent remedies. With this bottom-up approach, we can remove what is out of date or unfit for purpose, which will ultimately help ensure we deliver the right tactical effect on the enemy when we meet them on the battlefield.

Zaluzhnyi sacked half of his generals before realising that the problem was the tactics and not those applying the tactics. We would do well to pre-empt this as best we can and get ahead of exposing any underlying issues.

 

All imagery credit to MOD.

1. http://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/our-people/a-soldiers-vales-and-standards
2. Valerii Zaluzhnyi, The design of war has changed, 2024
3. Operation Herrick Campaign Study, Directorate Land Warfare, LWC 2015
4. https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2023/09/army-announces-new-way-of-winning-future-wars
5. https://www.kcl.ac.uk/political-soldiers-do-political-imperatives-drive-uk-military-doctrine
6. Patrick Hennessey, The Junior Officer’s Reading Club, Killing Time and Fighting Wars, 2009, pp.127, published by Allen Lane
7. https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/tag/tradition 2024
8. Nam.ac.uk/the-regimental-system, 2024
9. Ferguson A. D, Does Tradition hold us Back? 2024, pp. 01
10. https;//www.quotesmaster.web.2nt.com/arujo/45-military-brotherhood-quotes.html, 2024
11. https://shop.historynet.com/blogs/new-the-latest-from-historynet-com, How Did Corporal Punishment End in the Military? 2024
12. Sahr.org.uk The Debate in Parliament about the Abolition of Flogging, 2024
13. Reuters.com, ‘Game of Drones’, 2024
14. DIO supports largest military training exercise on Salisbury Plain – GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) 2024
15. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/11/1/7426785 War is Entering a New Stage, 2023