The Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force

BLUF: This paper proposes the creation of the structures and conditions required to train, lead and deploy a cost-effective Citizen Tri-service Reserve Force at scale during periods of stretch, tension, crisis or war. The Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force would be available for use.

(1) as a third echelon front line fighting force,

(2) providing rear area and lines of communication security and

(3) in homeland defence, protecting critical national infrastructure.This will be achieved by establishing cadres of experienced ex Regulars and Volunteer Reservists capable of initially training and subsequently leading the Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force.

Against a changing threat the UK is likely to require more people in uniform than we have now. The Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force concept utilises those who have already served, putting them in place to prepare thoroughly as training and leadership cadres while saving in the short to medium term the cost of recruiting, remunerating and equipping the bulk of the rank and file (90% of the workforce). It then sets the conditions to expand when required by having experienced leadership in place to build around.

Strategic background

The threats facing NATO in general and the UK in particular have escalated dramatically following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Furthermore, Eastern Europe is only one of several areas of the world where tensions have risen substantially over recent months and years; any of the others of which (eg Taiwan, Middle East) could erupt so as to distract key allies at a critical moment, potentially reducing their ability to support their NATO commitments in Europe. Additionally, depending on the attitude of individual NATO members, including a possible future US President, Article 5 of the NATO Treaty may not be quite as binding as is widely assumed.

All of this needs to be set against a context in which the UK has the smallest standing army since Waterloo. Our navy and air force are similarly diminutive. Our Defence remains configured primarily for discretionary campaigning (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) and has not yet fully switched to prepare for non-discretionary conflict against a peer adversary. The current SDR provides an opportunity to address this necessary change in orientation, which is likely to require the provision of mass in uniform.

Why we need the ability to generate mass

As demonstrated clearly in Ukraine, in a war of any duration, units become worn out and need replacing in the line to rest and recuperate. The UK has no provision for this.

Secondly, if the UK is operating in Eastern Europe in support of its NATO allies, it will have extremely long lines of communication along which its ammunition, equipment, workforce and rations will need to travel. Protecting such lines of communication needs “teeth” units, including infantry, light armour and air defence, especially against drones.

Thirdly, substantial additional resources are needed to support the defence of the UK’s critical national infrastructure.

The outgoing Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Patrick Sanders, publicly raised the importance of the UK’s ability to create military mass if required in a time of crisis in January 2024. He was referring to a citizen army (the “third echelon”) which history shows is needed to win our wars; under this concept, as in both World Wars, a small core of Regulars (the “first echelon”) fight to buy time; the Volunteer Reserves (the “second echelon”) then reinforce and help to hold the line; and the citizen army (the “third echelon”) concludes the conflict.

Access to large numbers of cost-effective teams and a trained workforce from all three services would be essential in such circumstances. Warfighting assumptions always expect a war to be over within weeks rather than months or years (the size of our armed forces is indeed currently based on this assumption); history, and current events in Ukraine, shows this to be over-optimistic. Alongside a need for a deployable third echelon and for rear area security and protection of lines of communication to the front line, a requirement would rapidly emerge to assist in protecting critical national infrastructure. A Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force could fulfil part or all of these needs.

The threat to critical national infrastructure

The UK’s Civil Defence infrastructure was dismantled as part of the “peace dividend” following the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent breakup of the USSR. The UK has no equivalent to the USA’s Federal Emergency Management Agency or of several EU states’ civil protection agencies.

Concerningly, however, there are a number of ways in which a hostile actor could relatively quickly increase the burden of Civil Defence above that which is manageable by the fragmented police forces with nominal responsibility, including the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the MoD Police, the British Transport Police, the Ports and Tunnels Police and the civil police services across the UK. Critical national infrastructure, of which, as the Ukrainians have discovered, 21st-century countries have a great deal, is a potential target for a determined enemy to sabotage; there is also plenty of scope for such an enemy to use social media to foment civil unrest from a distance. While there is provision for the Armed Services to provide Military Aid to the Civil Authorities, this is only possible if the resources are available. This would be particularly challenging in circumstances where the UK were simultaneously transitioning to a war footing.

As an island nation, much of what we consume comes in by ship or aviation. Our airfields, ports and docks will need protecting as will our under-water cables transporting electricity from our offshore windfarms and internet traffic with overseas counterparties. For this reason, the Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force is specifically intended to be Tri-service, with an important contribution from all three services.

Public attitudes to military service

Ukraine has shown that however reluctant public attitudes may be towards military service during relative stability, such attitudes change dramatically when the barbarians approach the gate. From a population of about 40 million, Ukraine was able to recruit half a million personnel between the date of the Russian invasion and July 2022. The UK could do similar if the conditions were right and the imperative of an immediate threat was allowed to override the requirement to use the current, discredited recruiting system.

The perception of national safety, which has grown over the 30 years since the Berlin wall came down, means that the UK no longer has a popular national focus on Defence that countries on the eastern flank of NATO increasingly do now have. A change of government provides an opportunity for a new national narrative along the lines of ‘Defence is everybody’s business’.

The need for trainers and leaders

Despite its ability to recruit mass quickly, what Ukraine was crucially unable to do was to provide its own experienced personnel to train those recruits, so its international allies needed to step up and provide the training. Equally, there was no leadership structure in place at all levels, from junior to combined arms to senior headquarters, so after the successes of the first and second echelons (the Ukrainian army and National Guard), the follow-on force suffered heavy losses in poorly-led operations.

A cost-effective solution

This proposal:

Aims at tackling the need for structures to enable the creation of units to provide mass and fill in missing specialisms in a time of crisis for war fighting, protecting lines of communication and home defence, all at exceptionally low cost.
Recommends raising a large number of cadres of trained and experienced ex Regular and Volunteer Reservist service personnel who would, on the basis of a substantially lower state of readiness and therefore costs and training burden than the current Regular and Volunteer Reserve forces, be in place to train and lead the Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force when required. There might be scope to involve those who have had life-changing injuries in recent conflicts as trainers.
Contemplates that these should be raised across the nation, each to train, and when trained to lead a Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force major unit (or naval or air force equivalent). Some would have generalist and some specialist roles and use of individuals’ former military and subsequent civilian qualifications would be maximised.
Proposes that amongst the cadres are some which are specifically structured to provide and train staff for higher formation headquarters, drawing on existing staff qualifications and making use of Reserve staff training courses.

This proposal is potentially more impactful than immediately dealing with the challenge of recruiting the mass of untrained people, acute as that may seem.

It is true now, as it was in the two world wars, that you can train a basic volunteer relatively quickly. What you cannot do quickly is produce experienced officers and NCOs. Without the backbone, the structure fails – there is nothing on which to hang the increased mass, or even to train it. This has been a major factor driving failures for both the Russian and Ukrainian militaries in their current conflict. After the early successes of both their regular troops and National Guard (eg the Azov Brigade in Mariupol) as the Army expanded further it lost cohesion. Ukraine’s 2023 offensive was particularly affected; despite adequate numbers of troops and vehicles, conceptually they were unable to pull together higher level combined arms actions. Instead, after early failure (at least until very recently when it took the war into Russia) the force reverted to what it could manage – very small scale actions that placed lower reliance on experienced leaders.

The UK already has the people with the necessary training and experience. What they require is a structure and the continuation training to keep their skills current and up-to date.

The cadres

To enable the raising of a substantial Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force in imminent anticipation of a national military emergency it is assumed simplistically that a training and leadership cadre could manage to train and lead a body ten times its own size.

In an environment in which the government is aiming to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP when it can afford it, this proposal will allow it to establish, for a relatively modest investment, the critical training and leadership core of a Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force leaving it to decide when to gear it up with the recruitment of the untrained 90% when the threat level increases.

We envisage the cadres principally being co-located with Volunteer Reserve Forces units with analogous roles to maximise the training benefits.

Each member of a cadre would have (1) a war time leadership role and (2) a training specialism. Across the cadre, these would need to cover the full range of training requirements of the unit. The annual training of each member of the cadre would need to encompass:

Keeping current on their respective training specialism, for example by attending courses (each a maximum of a week in alternate (even) years) including using online/ virtual and new technologies;
Training and exercising in their wartime leadership role, through TEWTS (tactical exercises without troops), study periods and innovative training which modern technology can enhance (weekends/ training week in alternate (odd) years); and
Annual testing of critical battleworthy attributes such as fitness and gunnery/ marksmanship (carried out over a day or weekend each year).

It is critical that the training is sufficiently interesting and enjoyable to attract and retain people of the highest calibre. For many who have left the Regular forces but who miss the camaraderie of military life and for whom the time commitment of Volunteer Reserve service is too great, and for Volunteer Reservists whose civilian jobs (through, for example, promotion) have made Volunteer Reserve service no longer achievable, this hits a bullseye.

Headquarters staffs

The UK’s armed forces, especially the Army, will need the capacity to expand the manpower of their first and second echelon headquarters staffs. The UK has not operated or exercised at large formation (division, and certainly not above) level for many years and we need to develop and practice our ability to command and control large formations. The third echelon itself would need its own higher level command and control structures.

Since the end of the Cold War the UK’s population has increased and we have become more reliant on a ‘just in time’ approach to all matters of supply chain. This, combined with changes in the threat with precision weapons and cyber, increases the vulnerability of our CNI, as we have seen in Ukraine. Other Govt Departments (OGD) with protection responsibilities are configured for a business-as-usual approach and would need reinforcement in time of crisis. A compelling recent example would be the Covid pandemic, where OGDs very quickly consumed military support under Op RESCRIPT.

The laydown of the Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force therefore needs to include amongst its cadres a number specifically structured (and manned, for example including retired senior regular and reserve officers) to provide and train staff for higher formation headquarters and to act as military liaison officers.

The Home Service Force – a precedent

A precedent exists (despite it having a different form and a narrower function) for providing such a force as that envisaged on an exceptionally cost effective basis. This was the Home Service Force (HSF) which was established in the late 1980s. The HSF proved much more successful than was expected and was rapidly established at 5,000, taking in people with a minimum of two years of experience in either the Regular Army or Volunteer Reserves for 4-5 weekends a year and an evening a month.

The reason for its exceptionally low cost was, first, due to it being made up of already trained personnel, ex-regulars and territorials. Secondly, by basing each HSF company with a (then) TA unit (which could be extended now to some of the better Cadet Centres), there were no infrastructure costs. The only equipment was a set of clothing and a personal weapon, and vehicles were borrowed from the parent unit in peacetime (with commandeering planned for war). With a little help from a parent TA unit with permanent staff this all made it extremely good value for money. In principle a much larger force could have followed this model by putting several HSF companies or even a battalion with each sub-unit location rather than one sub-unit per unit, requiring only a modest allocation of additional permanent staff.

The HSF was disbanded in 1992 because of the end of the Cold War but had been a huge success for the modest investment made. The new proposed force would differ from the HSF, which was a small number of complete company-sized units rather than a large number of cadres for major units. The HSF was also exclusively part of the Army (whereas this proposal would be tri-service) and was principally tasked with key point defence in time of war. However a Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force would have a similar exceptionally low-cost profile to that of the HSF by being bolted onto the existing Volunteer Reserve Forces in the same way. A trial for the Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force at a few locations would be inexpensive.

The naval element could be seen as re-establishing something like the former Royal Naval Auxiliary Service (RNXS) but extending its remit beyond ports to other critical coastal infrastructure and offshore windfarms and cables. A Royal Marines Reserve component would also be valuable.

The RAF element could provide the framework for more RAF Regiment squadrons, including perhaps a role in defence of dispersed elements of air power and critical national infrastructure against drones.

National Resilience support

In addition to their primary tasks of providing cadres for units and headquarters for a third echelon and home defence, the cadres would also be able to provide, in peacetime, watchkeepers and other leadership or specialist functions to assist with national resilience tasks, allowing the Regular and existing Volunteer Reserve Forces to continue to focus on current tasks and training, especially where the Volunteer Reserve Forces are orientated towards more demanding roles that require increased knowledge and currency/competency.

Accessing the Strategic Reserve

In the 1980s the Army experienced considerable difficulty getting access to members of its Regular Reserve, who were not regularly exercised or trained, when they were called for to support large exercises. Under the Reserve Forces Review 2030 the newly re named “Strategic Reserve” is charged with generating “previously unassigned surge capacity and wider access to expertise in times of crisis or national emergency”.

The 2005 Ministry of Defence document Future use of the UK’s Reserve Forces (7th February 2005) noted: Members of the Regular Reserve often have a great deal of experience, but their skills and fitness tend to fade rapidly after leaving the Regular Forces … Therefore, when mobilising Reservists, we will turn first to the Volunteer Reserve Force (VRF) and only mobilise Regular Reservists when the relevant VRF resources have been exhausted or the particular capability required does not exist within the VRF.

A significant benefit of utilising a proportion of the Strategic Reserve (together with high quality ex Volunteer Reservists) to form the core army element of the cadres of the Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force is that it would open and enhance communication channels to members of the Strategic Reserve (as it would to ex Volunteer Reservists), help to keep their skills up to date and provide a structure so they can be utilised efficiently and effectively.

Recruitment of the bulk of the Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force in time of tension

Recruitment of the bulk of the Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force itself, ie the 90% which did not form part of the cadres, would need to be carefully phased to allow a viable force to be built up to face threats as they emerge while keeping costs manageable. Budgets permitting, some cadres should at the appropriate moment be selected to begin to recruit and develop civilians with no military experience to a basic trained level. This would help spread military ethos and understanding, attract people to service and start to generate numbers beyond the initial training and leadership cadres. Training requirements, as for cadre members, could be a week a year and a couple of weekends, with multiple easily accessible opportunities for people to get involved and low thresholds to entry.

The training must reflect the realities that younger generations do not understand military service, although many are seeking new experiences more than most other things in life, which the military can readily offer. High value is now placed on time – something the Services don’t do well, with their health and safety driven and bureaucratic approach to training. This is not about pay (daily rates applying to Reservists of equivalent seniority are contemplated), but rather the value of the experience, and its convenience around busy lives.

This may seem like a tall ask, but quasi-military organisations are already achieving it, as are any number of civilian volunteer bodies. After all, no one is getting paid to play local sports at the weekend, despite the commitment; the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (highly successful, and not as well-known as deserved) provide emergency assistance to the Metropolitan Police; and civilian organisations such as Team Rubicon, the veteran-led disaster relief organisation, achieve a great deal on little funding. People do these things because they value the activity, challenge and team feeling, and doing something useful and worthy.

The modern work/life approach particularly suits a more flexible model of engagement where experience and value of time spent by volunteers is weighed above remuneration, and a new, wider reserve body would provide high returns on the required investment.

Medical standards could be based on GP sign-off (maybe renewed annually). All training would take place within defined risk parameters for simplicity, and using insurance and other measures as already in place elsewhere to support volunteering. There should be no barriers on e.g. using personal transport to attend training. Training could also easily take place alongside scheduled Regular and Volunteer Reserve activities, offering efficiencies of scale. In terms of equipment, this would just be a basic set of personal combat equipment for each person, sufficient for field activity. This can be kept simple, for example excluding CBRN.

Conclusion

Overall, the Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force would be a highly cost-effective way to:

Provide a low-cost framework upon which the UK could rapidly build, train and lead a citizen force to form the bulk of the third echelon as well as to provide Military Aid to the Civil Authorities to protect critical national infrastructure;
Embed the military more widely across society, with increased local presence and knowledge of service;
Be a worthwhile way for ex-Regulars and Volunteer Reservists (including perhaps some with life changing injuries) to remain involved with relatively low demands on their time, taking the best of soldiering and removing the reasons they likely left in the first place; and
Assist in leadership roles with local resilience tasks.

To make a success of the Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force a number of critical matters would need to be resolved, such as the process for recruitment both of the cadres and of the Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force itself; access to equipment; and access to land for training. There is not room in this brief document to deal with these, but the authors have proposals which can be fleshed out in discussion.

Editor’s note: This piece is the opinion of the authors and does not reflect an official position.

Lord Rupert de Mauley

Lord de Mauley, a former commanding officer of an Army Reserve regiment and government parliamentary under-secretary. He is now chairman of the Council of the Reserve Forces and Cadets Associations and of the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee.

Justin Crump

Justin Crump, a defence, intelligence and security expert with nearly 30 years' service with the British military and who continues to serve in the UK Volunteer Reserves. He is CEO of Sibylline, the strategic intelligence consultancy he founded in 2010. He has served on operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan.