I Like The Word Lethal

“I like the word lethal. It is reminiscent [. . .] of pretty women and muscular men in classy hotels. Of secret negotiations and ice cubes in 25-year-old scotch glasses. [. . .].”

Commentator in a study by Ofra Ben Ishai

In this brief article, I will propose that the concept of lethality, aside from being poorly defined, has become a bleak commodity for Western military leaders. To be used as a tool for political consumption, devoid of real worth beyond permitting those who wish so to sweep aside any falsely perceived ‘ethical’ barriers to the conduct of war. Notably military forces that have not paid much heed to such ethics, for example, the Russians, conduct themselves on the battlefield and in occupation, already at the ultimate end-state of this dark consumerism. Lethality is becoming a military fiction as far removed from reality as any James Bond movie.

That numerous Western militaries are now placing this at the centre of their national defence is, to me, both an act of desperation and a neglect of senior leaders’ duties. It is a myth that shields itself from scrutiny. I will outline three points that you may wish to consider to gain a better understanding of my perspective. The first will be a rather heavy, but mercifully brief, interpretation of lethality as consumerism, using the work of post-modern sociologist Zygmunt Bauman. Second, outline the simple fact that lethality is so poorly defined as to be conceptually meaningless, and finally, to dissect through first principles some of the recent leadership statements about lethality and how they raise more questions than provide answers.

Post-Modern Sociologists

Like many post-modern sociologists, Zygmunt Bauman saw the termination of the ‘rational’ modern society in the concentration camps of the Holocaust. Rational man, bringing industrial-scale slaughter to humanity. In its place now stands a world devoid of rational values; the only cause for existence is to consume. How much you possess being the only mark of merit. Whilst this appears to be a potentially dark future, Bauman does see this as an opportunity, where the individual is now unconstrained by the guardrails of modernism. It is also important to note that societies don’t just step over the border from modernism to postmodernism; these are theories, and of course, reality is far more complex. But Bauman’s ideas are powerful ones.

But it is in the darker aspects of Bauman’s postmodernism that I see the relationship between the military and lethality. To suggest that the political process surrounding military strategy is not immersed in post-modernism is a form of profound cognitive dissonance. Politics at present is a prime case study in Bauman’s thesis; military strategy like it or not is inseparable from that. To use the words of General Miley, ‘militaries don’t fight war, nations do,’ post-modern nations.

Lethality is becoming a commodity, an end in itself; sacks of shiny lethality become the worth of a military organisation. Detached from the necessity of military prudence. An anchorless idea that the Vietnam War and the outcomes of Western militaries in recent attempts at ‘nation building’ with massively overmatched firepower show is void. The problem with any form of consumerism is that it is always form over substance; the unique and well-advertised commodity is immediately desirable and not subject to critique of its worth. The recent strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities being a prime example, any questioning of the strategy (or lack thereof) and effectiveness was immediately viewed as unpatriotic.

Additionally, noting that the engines of this lethality consumerism, the defence industry, will do nothing to check this voraciousness. The entrance of numerous venture capital companies into the sector is a telling indicator.

Things are entirely subjective

My second point is that, like commodities themselves, what is desirable is entirely subjective. Additionally, as Stephen Wren had demonstrated with the advent of ‘modern’ bullets at the turn of the 19^th Century, the lethality debate has been around a long time. The idea that the new bullets would make war more efficient and more humane is not new, nor is the still familiar implication that they had to be particularly effective against ‘uncivilised’ peoples. Quantifying the effect in this case remained elusive until World War I demonstrated that, while they were more efficient, they certainly were not more humane.

Interestingly, Srdan Korac raises a similar issue in the use of non-lethal weapon systems by Western nations; the dehumanising effect he highlights around these weapons is now returning to the lethal debate.

This problem of the definition of lethality and understanding raised by Wren still exists today, as a 2023 study states, ‘Lethality as a concept is often poorly defined … Measuring lethality provides important information to senior decision makers, yet measuring lethality also potentially creates operational vulnerabilities.’ Quite a paradox, it is both important and complex to measure. Military planners are no strangers to paradox (or at least shouldn’t be), but paradox as a cornerstone to a military future is a somewhat perplexing approach. Particularly when the authors of this report highlight that it is but one aspect of optimal military performance.

This lack of an accurate definition, one probably unobtainable, leads me to my third brief consideration. If you try to dissect recent statements, do they hold any meaning?

I am not going to review the statements of the current US Secretary of Defence, statements alluding to lethality being in, and values out, they are indicative of a fundamental ignorance of the nature of war, and fertiliser for the next generation of radicalised threats. Aside from his already being proven fallacious on many issues (including the invasion of Taiwan being imminent), post-modern, perhaps, but realistic it is not. The statements are not worthy of analysis; beyond the risks he imposes on his own nation’s long-term security.

Yet the bungled operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—and more recently in Libya—illustrated that killing people does not extinguish conflict but causes it to flare, leading to a vicious spiral of violence with more and more people willing to retaliate to U.S. military action abroad rather than docilely accept whatever the superpower decrees.

Laurie Calhoun

Double or triple lethality?

I would like to debate the current UK desire to increase lethality to double, triple, or even ten times its current level. Three aspects, in particular, the logistic dream or nightmare that such figures represent, the technological ignorance such statements entail and finally, what if the enemy gets a say (and they do).

The recent statement by Defence Secretary John Healy that lethality will be increased tenfold raises an interesting issue. An infantry section will now carry the firepower of an infantry company (I am using the term carry to mean both direct and indirect), a fighter the firepower of a squadron. Logistically, this is either a dream or a nightmare; it is also undoubtedly the end of any rapid movement. I cannot understand, even with greater surveillance and targeting, how such a massive increase is achieved, let alone how it can be sustained. Interestingly, the statement makes no mention of the enhanced logistic tail necessary to achieve such. All the systems stated have their support infrastructure, one of note being the power-hungry nature of AI. It seems some are forgetting the Shell Crisis of 1915.

Secondly, the implication is that current military systems are not at the cutting edge of technology. Integrated Circuits and coding seem to be representative of true technological advancement. Somehow forgetting, for example, the decades of progress in armour protection, gun and ammunition technology of all types. Anyone sitting down for a moment to look at the energetics of a 120mm tank gun should be in awe of how, every time it fires, it hits a vehicle target at over 2,000 meters instead of blowing itself up. The recent exoatmospheric kills of Iranian ballistic missiles are another example that the exquisite legacy should not be overlooked, nor somehow viewed as inferior.

Thirdly and most obviously, if a ten times improvement is available, there seems to be an assumption that everyone else will sit on their hands? As Stephen Biddle tells us, technical military advantage is transitory, which may be enough in some cases, but all opponents adapt. Notably, if there is no systemic mismatch, such as World War I, technical stalemate dominates. Additionally, assuming the rest of NATO is awake, which it now seems to be, how the UK maintains its apparent ‘leadership’ in NATO, through lethality, remains unanswered. Nice talking points in a conference, perhaps, but leadership based solely on being more ‘lethal’?

So what?

I only use the UK Secretary of Defence’s comment as a tool for discussion. As a ‘once was’ military person, I believe in the adage, ‘too much firepower is barely enough.’ As the eminent likes of T.X. Hammes and A. Palazzo have perceptively assessed (before the commencement of the current Russian-Ukrainian War), the dominance of the defence has returned. So, perhaps instead of piling on to the obvious ‘more lethality’ response (even though all is not what it seems regarding drones), perhaps intellectual effort and resources should be pushed towards breaking that dominance. Considering the current war, and going, ‘more lethality please,’ seems somewhat unimaginative. It seems the core definition of combat power has been forgotten. Worse, lethality is somehow being seen as a genuine solution to military strategy. Got a problem? Well, we will be ‘lethal’. These are my comments on public statements; perhaps people in windowless rooms are questioning this, which would be heartening.

I have attempted to transition from the societal to the tactical level in a brief article. I have put aside the even deeper concerns I have about toxic hyper-masculinity, the video gamification of combat, that lethality worship brings; I have only lightly touched on the deeply racist implications of the concept in both historical and contemporary terms. It is being used as a prop to cover a genuine lack of both strategy and substantive force development.

Is advanced computing changing the conduct of war? Yes, that is clear. Technical revolutions are seldom military alone; the printing press, industrial-scale production, railways, aircraft, and nuclear power brought rapid change. Now it is the cheap, mass-produced integrated circuit. That is what is going on. To think that this change is solely pivoting around an ill-defined concept of lethality is to make the same mistake as pre-World War I military thinkers.

What concerns me most is the poor definition of lethality; it is a paradox that is likely unresolvable. Further problematic is that it nests in the rudderless nature of post-modern society. I don’t have a ready-made solution; the current seems relatively strong to swim against. However, I would recommend a few more people asking the question, ‘Well, what do you mean by that statement?’

‘In a democracy, military strategy should be determined by elected officials, rather than in interaction between the military and its favourite sources of legitimacy.’

Stephen Coleman