General Sanders was evidently as blunt as he felt he could be in his valedictory communication when standing down as Chief of the General Staff (CGS). From day 1 of his appointment he was publicly candid about the size of the Army, which did not sit well with the Secretary of State for Defence; it is well known that even exceptional politicians find it difficult to cope with inconvenient truths. Nevertheless, Wallace was considered one of our better politicians. I still wonder why the shining star that was Wallace faded so quickly. I do hope there is not an unedifying explanation.
Sanders’ assessment of British Army decline was as explicit as he dared to be but full of implicit warnings that will be lost on most people. He was absolutely right to make the case to re-arm as fast as we can (a huge challenge given our sclerotic acquisition processes). What was left largely unsaid is the inability of the Army to prepare, deploy and sustain itself in the field.
During the Cold War, when we used to spend around 6% of GDP on Defence, the Army had four deployable Divisions, that exercised as a Corps within NATO. In the same era, ‘Stables’ parades were a feature of unit life whereby vehicles were taken out of their garages and cleaned, repaired and maintained. Detachment, vehicle or Crew Commanders and their associated personnel became very knowledgeable about the state of their vehicles; knew their strengths, weaknesses and idiosyncrasies. Understandably, a bond was formed with the vehicle platform that was to bear these personnel into and/or in battle. Being so in touch with key equipment heightened the chance of success in combat; the like of which has been torpedoed by something called Whole Fleet Management (WFM), arguably one of the most destructive policies ever implemented.
The bulk of vehicles and equipment are no longer in unit lines, but held centrally (and certainly not enough to equip a comprehensive mobilisation) and ‘maintained’. With the bonds of ownership broken, prior to an exercise (or Operation), vehicles and equipment are delivered from a central pool, quite often not on time or in a good state, and preparation/repair/familiarisation eats into valuable training time. Worse still, a paucity of military vehicles is often offset by civilian rental vehicles, which detracts from training and credibility still further, and some exercises would in all likelihood fail completely if personal mobile phones were not used; which tells you more about the Army’s communications systems than it does about poor signals security behaviour. Whilst WFM may make sense to accountants, it has destroyed the crucial link of familiarity between operator and vehicle platform and signals equipment, that is likely to make a difference in the crucible of combat. Even if there were sufficient numbers of vehicles, there is a NATO-wide critical lack of strategic and operational lift capacity, whether that be air, maritime, rail or by road, to get them to the right place on time.
Back in the 80s the British Army had over 1,000 Main Battle Tanks (MBT). On the books today there are 200 or so. I would risk a lot of money in betting that only about 100 are actually fully serviceable.
As Sanders asked when he became CGS: why would he want to reduce the size of the Army in these turbulent times? Re-arming is one thing. Increasing the size of the Army is quite another. The rot set in with the demise of the Junior Army back in the 90s, compounded, amongst other things, by a disastrous privatisation of the recruiting function. Units are much reduced in size in terms of personnel. The persistent reduction of “our most important asset”1 necessitates the Army policy direction for new capability programmes to aim for personnel levels of less than the current level or at worst: no more. The reality is that many new capabilities will require greater personnel levels than currently, particularly if the Army is to double and then triple its capability. Even if the sensible decision was made to increase the size of the Army; many barracks are now civilian housing estates.
Bullies bully only when they think they can get away with it. Has NATO Article 5 been invoked in cyberspace? What did the UK do in 2014 when Ukraine was invaded for the first time? Nobody should have been surprised when Putin ordered the second invasion of Ukraine in 2022 given the encouragement he was given through previous inaction by the ‘rules based’ nations; and, for some time now, China has been testing the water in the South China Seas and further afield, as well as in the ‘grey space’. A series of pandemics have come from China (two bird flus, two swine diseases, Covid and Ash die back). Was this by accident? Was this deliberate? Either way these catastrophes have to be a critical cause for concern, along with China’s addiction to coal-fired power stations, now numbering well over 1,000 and still rising. What happened in Spain recently will occur with ever more frequency. China has never hidden its long term strategic goal or apparently cared about the associated consequences. The ‘rules based’ nations must up their game and the UN has to start functioning to address China’s increasing carbon output (now annually well more than twice that of the US). Will the UK project some much needed leadership? If so, it would help if it were backed by a more credible conventional military capability.
Some progress in the British Army has however been hailed, such as beards and the Stonewall rating; nevertheless, such policies will do little to deter our adversaries. Only Armed Forces capability expansion will cause pause for thought and possibly act as a deterrent. Carrying on as we are now will certainly allow bullies to think they can get away with it.
Hand in hand with an increase in Service personnel must be an overhauled Defence procurement system that is led by operational analysis (OA), as opposed to political interference; the latter has caused multiple instances of appalling acquisition and breath-taking money wasting. The expensive review of the AJAX Programme pointedly did not address the obvious question as to why the wrong vehicle was chosen in the first place. If as much effort was expended in OA led procurement as there is in covering up incompetence, then the UK Armed Forces would be in a significantly better state.
A recent populist and panicky question is: where is our “Iron Dome”? The UK is the highest-spending nation on Defence that does not have a Land-based Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system. With OA-based acquisition and Defence procurement without political perversion (and it’s associated opportunity cost), the UK could have had such a capability, and a lot more besides. You will hear the term ‘benchmark army’ or ‘Tier 1 military’ in association with the British Army. It is sheer hubris to think such a thing now. You may also hear earnest discussions about ‘mass’, in association with British Army tactics, which is frankly delusional.
The basics require re-learning, such as: soldiers living in the field whilst manoeuvring for prolonged periods of time. Large scale exercises that practised high-intensity conventional warfare were common 40 years ago. They are now rare. Units spent weeks or even months living and moving in the field throughout the exercise season. It is likely that such a skill has now faded amongst many units, where central feeding, based on working from a static operating base, has become the norm. Have the soldiers even got the equipment and correct type of rations to cook for themselves in the field for sustained periods? Even if they have the equipment and skills to do this, does the capability exist to move Combat Supplies about the battlespace, are there enough Logistics vehicle platforms, of the right quality and quantity with the personnel to drive them? Whilst we may have a few guns and tanks left, and even if Combat Supplies could be moved about at scale and in a timely way, it is no secret that there is insufficient ammunition to sustain the fight.
As well as beards there has been a blizzard of name-changes and re-organisation, much of it presented as progress, whilst the reality is further confusion and increasing disenfranchisement of the workforce (including MoD Civil Servants). Breaking the territorial link of the TAVR and creating ‘Reserves’ reduced the profile of the military in the community. Much money has been spent on ‘innovation’ with things like ‘the BattleLab’. Properly resourcing Trials and Development Units would have been far more effective.
The military, and the Army in particular, has been in systemic decline for decades. Politicians allowed this to happen, but you expect such behaviour from people like that. What is less expected is the apparent collusion of successive senior officers, who know all too well what will happen if a contingency operation has insufficient Communications, Air Defence, or ammunition, or vehicles, or Air support, and perhaps most important at all: suitably qualified and experienced personnel.
Arguably, the Army has fallen below critical mass, with the majority of its equipment very aged and with limited ammunition stocks. Patrick Sanders knew this before he was appointed CGS and tried to improve the situation. Perhaps his less than sycophantic attitude limited his tenure, and therefore his ability to put things right; hence his last pronouncements articulate his frustration with a government that deliberately continued the decline of the Armed Forces and the Army in particular. Will the change in administration, and the outcome of the associated costly Defence Review, make a difference?